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  Developments have effectively turned the third cabinet led by Mark Rutte as 
prime minister (Rutte III) into a minority government that requires support 
from non-coalition parties to implement its government agreement, at least to 
the degree possible. The Rutte III cabinet consists of four political parties 
(VVD, CDA, D66, CU). It began with the smallest-possible parliamentary 
majority (76 out of 150 seats), but lost this when one VVD lawmaker, ousted 
due to violations of ethics rules, broke away from his parliamentary party 
group but decided to keep his seat nonetheless. Meanwhile, the Dutch political 
landscape has changed. In the 2019 provincial elections, the right-wing 
populist Forum for Democracy party, a political newcomer, proved to be the 
big winner. Although the party participated in government coalition 
negotiations in all provinces (there is no formal “cordon sanitaire” in the 
Netherlands), it failed to gain a foothold in the government anywhere. 
However, it entered the Senate with 12 seats, the same number as the VVD, 
which had heretofore been the largest party. In the subsequent European 
Parliament elections, this right-wing populist surge was pushed back; the 
Forum for Democracy achieved just three seats, while Geert Wilders’ Party for 
Freedom won none.  
  
After a very slow start in 2017, the government managed to make good on its 
important promises to implement comprehensive new pension and climate 
agreements. In keeping with tradition, these legislative initiatives were first 
largely outsourced to societal consultative procedures (e.g., platforms or 
roundtables) in order to generate sufficient political acceptability 
(“draagvlak”), before being advanced to the parliamentary debate and approval 
stages. For some observers, these societal consultative procedures testify to the 
above-average quality and active role of civil society in Dutch democracy. To 
others, they demonstrate procedural sluggishness and the veto power wielded 
by organized societal interest groups such as business associations and trade 
unions. In the case of the pension agreement, this latter judgment appeared 
vindicated following the European Central Bank’s (ECB) ruling to reduce 
interest rates to an extremely low level, which had the effect of cutting into the 
obligatory financial reserves of the private pension funds. This immediately 
demonstrated the brittleness of the agreement, with the trade unions 
threatening to renege. In the case of the climate agreement, the ink of the 
stakeholders’ signatures had hardly dried when courts forced the government 
SGI 2020 | 3  Netherlands Report 
 
into a state of crisis management. In one case, the Supreme Court 
(Hoogerechtshof), upheld a previous verdict that the government had made 
insufficient effort to meet its own pledges in the Paris Accords. In separate 
cases, the High Court (Raad van State) ruled that the state had been negligent 
in failing to protect Nature 2000 areas from nitrogen deposits, and that the 
transport of toxic/polluted soil presented a risk to the general health of the 
population. The final outcome of this clash between the executive and the 
judicial branches of government remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it appears 
clear that the passage of the national climate agreement has placed climate-
change policy high on the political agenda.  
 
Since the 2007 – 2008 financial meltdown, strict austerity policies have 
produced a solid economic recovery, particularly over the last five years. 
However, this has been achieved at the cost of generating an inward-looking 
and volatile electorate. In a rather sudden turnaround, the Rutte III cabinet 
dumped its previous support for neoliberal austerity and business tax cuts in 
favor of policies aiming to repair a decade of growing income inequalities, 
focusing especially on the middle classes. This turn toward redistributive 
policy was in no small measure triggered by the fear that the costs of the 
climate agreement would be disproportionately borne by tax-paying citizens, 
instead of by polluting enterprises that had to be pushed toward 
environmentally friendly behavior.  
 
The performance of economic and social policies proved largely comparable 
to the previous year. Unemployment rates have declined substantially in recent 
years, although high rates of youth unemployment, almost exclusively in the 
non-regular and underpaid sectors of the labor market, remain cause for 
concern. The Dutch continue to do moderately well in most areas of social 
sustainability. That said, the systemic crisis in the education sector has 
manifested in teacher strikes, with teachers demanding higher wages (to attract 
better-quality teachers and alleviate the present shortage of qualified teachers), 
smaller classrooms and less work pressure. An excessively soft approach to 
anti-discrimination policy in recent years appears to have been an important 
driver in the establishment of DENK, a political party that appeals to Dutch 
citizens of second- and third-generation Turkish and Moroccan descent. 
DENK has been unable or unwilling to put the issue of integration on the 
national or local agendas. Instead, symbols of racism such as the Zwarte Piet 
(“Black Pete”) have mobilized the radical right, while the issue of racism has 
gained traction within mainstream debates due to hooligan scandals during 
soccer matches. Persistent anxieties among voters concerning immigration 
issues have also strengthened anti-immigration parties such as Forum for 
Democracy. In the realm of healthcare policy, excessive overall cost increases 
have been prevented; but prices for a large number of medicines have spiked. 
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The hybrid public-private healthcare system, given the amount of political 
turmoil following the sudden bankruptcy of several hospitals, appears to be 
losing legitimacy among left-of-center political parties and among citizens at 
large. 
 
Regarding rule-of-law performance, almost all institutions related to public 
safety and security, but especially the police and the judicial branch, currently 
face substantial challenges and are under increasing stress. Providing grounds 
for persistent concern, the political parties and government bureaucracy have 
shown an increasing disregard for rule-of-law requirements. For example, by 
relentlessly prosecuting as frauds families (often with only a single parent) that 
received childcare premiums on potentially dubious grounds, the tax 
authorities have severely duped hundreds or even thousands of bona fide 
families.   
 
The government apparatus is clearly lacking in the areas of executive capacity 
and accountability. There are visible and increasing implementation problems 
in many policy domains (e.g., teaching, agriculture, construction, hospital and 
youth care, policing, and maybe even the tax system), indicating that the lean 
government approach of recent years has left deep wounds that will not heal 
quickly. Interministerial coordination and agency monitoring efforts are 
substandard. There are increasing problems with the country’s public ICT 
systems and large-scale rail and road infrastructure. Regarding water 
management, a traditionally strong area of Dutch governance, administrative 
reforms have been implemented more smoothly. Budget cuts associated with 
the devolution of central-government welfare functions, for instance in areas 
such as youth care, has effectively threatened the long-term decentralization of 
welfare policies to local governments. In the area of public safety and security, 
a contrary trend toward rapid centralization and bureaucratization has led to 
problems in policing (e.g., staffing, regional and local presence, and ethics 
concerns) and, as has become abundantly clear, the judiciary (in the court 
system generally, and with the management of judges and access to the 
judicial system more specifically). In the realm of accountability, weak intra-
party democracy and a lack of citizen policy knowledge are causes for 
concern. At the local level, experiments with more inclusive participatory and 
deliberative policymaking tools are increasingly common. However, these are 
rarely able to address systemic issues, as they are still limited to the margins of 
community-level policy. 
 
Overall, Dutch politics and policies still appear sustainable. However, 
challenges are accumulating. The government should seek to loosen policy 
deadlocks over attempts to address socioeconomic inequalities, address 
climate-change deficits, involve citizens more in the early stages of 
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policymaking, enhance local government and citizen participation in policy 
implementation, set clear goals and priorities in the areas of environmental and 




  Three challenges affecting the sustainability of governance in the Netherlands 
remain insufficiently addressed: the maintenance of traditional state functions 
and the integrity of the separation of powers, the transition to a sustainable 
economy, and the need to address growing inequalities in income and living 
standards. However, long-term sustainable-governance issues in the country 
overall present a highly mixed picture.  
 
With regard to policy-performance indicators, on the one hand, the country 
appears to live up to its double reputation of proper economic and social 
policymaking. The government has shown solid, traditional macroeconomic 
management, and has preserved international competitiveness. Within these 
constraints, it has also retained its commitment to the social management of 
care – that is, by maximizing the probability of good care for every citizen, 
especially for the elderly, the sick and the economically disadvantaged (e.g., 
unemployed or poor people). On the other hand, efforts to pursue 
environmentally sustainable practices headed into a crisis in 2019, felt 
particularly within the agriculture, infrastructure and home-construction 
sectors. Serious implementation gaps and manpower shortages have emerged 
in policy areas including education, housing, (youth and hospital) care, 
infrastructure construction, public transport, and policing and judicial work – 
these latter two areas all the more worrisome given efforts to fight drug-related 
and (financial) cybercrime. These shortcomings represent the scars left by a 
decade of austerity policies and efforts to do more with less.  
 
The first challenge involves ensuring that traditional state functions are well 
maintained. In this regard, the Dutch will have to increase their military 
capacity and spending over a relatively short period. Reforms to the police 
force, judiciary and public prosecution service have run into implementation 
obstacles and produced serious ethical concerns. Without adequate attention, 
these problems may become chronic. Government tasks in the domain of the 
public finances require that tax officials’ integrity be unimpeachable, and that 
serious steps are taken to tackle the country’s reputation as a tax haven for 
large sums of foreign (U.S. and Russian) capital. In large parts of the country, 
there are serious symptoms of state failure with regard to protecting citizens 
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from violence in the fight against drug-related crime. The police and judiciary 
have failed to stop the country from sliding toward becoming a so-called 
narcostate; porous harbors make the Netherlands the biggest entry point for 
drugs to the rest of Europe, and ineffective policing of sparsely populated rural 
areas has helped the country become the biggest exporter of synthetic drugs.  
 
Part of this challenge relates to the functioning of the Dutch political system as 
a trias politica model, or example of the separation of powers. Parliament 
increasingly lacks control over the executive. More and more tax income 
(legally) escapes parliamentary accountability rules. Compared to many other 
countries, the intellectual and financial resources provided to parliament are 
minimal. There is little effort to impose firm regulation of the conduct and 
finances of political parties, even though this makes them more reliant on and 
vulnerable to external funding. Even policy formulation itself is outsourced to 
government-sponsored think tanks, increasingly to commercial consultancies, 
and to the institutionalized stakeholder-consultation process referred to as 
“poldering.” Second and equally worrisome are symptoms of weakening of the 
judicial branch. The independence of the judicial branch is under pressure due 
to financial problems caused by government policy that has subjected the 
courts to performance-based pay – that is, pay per completed case. This has 
pushed judges to prioritize speed over quality. Judges and other personnel at 
the courts complain about work overload, which in turn leads to long delays in 
the resolution of court cases. The accessibility of the judiciary for citizens with 
minimal or merely average resources has been diminished by decisions to 
reduce the number of courts, and to reduce funding for the fees paid to public-
interest lawyers, who are leaving the profession in droves.  
 
The second major task is to design and facilitate a shift toward a sustainable 
economy. In large part, this is a matter of achieving environmental 
sustainability. The strong economic recovery experienced by the Netherlands 
has a flip side, in that it took a series of court rulings and a verdict by the High 
Council of State to push the government to begin catching up with the rest of 
the European Union with regard to implementing climate-change policies 
seriously. The rapid phase-out of natural-gas production before 2030 means 
that it will be vital to develop a new energy policy based on a transition to 
renewable energy sources. Public investment in sustainable transportation 
infrastructure can no longer be postponed in view of a looming congestion 
crisis. For all its innovation, Dutch agriculture contributes significantly to 
carbon dioxide and nitrogen emissions, as well as to the outbreak of diseases 
due to intensive livestock production, and must therefore be reformed. 
Nevertheless, the policy dynamics of 2019 may have proved to produce a 
turning point in heading toward the sustainable economy of the future. 
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The other part of achieving a sustainable economy is addressing increased 
socioeconomic inequality. As it is least rhetorically leaving neoliberalism 
behind, the government will have to adjust its income and tax laws. 
Foreseeable technological innovations (particularly digitalization, big data and 
the use of robots) necessitate modernization of the education system and the 
labor market. So far, labor-market reform is the only such area in which a 
long-term plan has been developed. Emergent and potentially disruptive 
technological innovation requires the development of a strategic approach to 
digitalization that will address its effects on human rights, while also 
introducing regulation and control mechanisms, and developing consensus-
building mechanisms able to handle contentious (ethical) issues. The 
increasing segregation across levels and types of schools needs to be 
addressed. The relevance of existing educational qualifications in a rapidly 
changing labor market is increasingly questionable, and education at all levels 
is inadequately financed and staffed.  
 
The third longer-term task is to strike a balance between identity politics and 
globalization. In the Netherlands, globalization manifests itself (among other 
indicators) through continuous immigration and an increasingly multiethnic 
population. Yet, to date, there has been no public debate about the future 
demographic composition and size of the population. The “Black Pete” 
disorders (which diminished in 2019), the housing shortage, overcrowding in 
trains, traffic congestion and ecological pressure more generally all signal the 
urgent need for new policies able to address the interdependent issues of 
sustainability, ethnicity and globalization. For the open Dutch economy, 
cooperation within the European context is crucial. And indeed, the Dutch 
government and the country’s political parties appear to have made a turn back 
toward Europe. 
 
It is increasingly clear that tackling these challenges will require new modes of 
constructive citizen participation and representation beyond traditional 
expressions such as protests and large-scale demonstrations. The gap between 
government policy on the one hand, and citizens’ feelings and experiences on 
the other, has created significant discontent and anti-establishment sentiment, 
feeding populist calls for more direct democracy. In view of recent negative 
experiences with national referendums in the Netherlands and elsewhere in 
Europe (e.g., the United Kingdom and Catalonia), the Rutte III cabinet, as one 
of its first policy actions, abandoned the national consultative referendum. 
Participatory democratic practices are (again) limited to the local and 
municipal level. Critics have called for a change of course away from 
“defensive” participation to the opening of a “second track” – that is, a more 
proactive form of participation, based on open dialogue, trust and cooperation. 
The extent to which this will be realized remains unclear.  
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The country’s new political cleavages – between citizens favoring closed and 
open borders; between freedom for corporations and stricter disciplinary 
interventions for ordinary citizens; between urban and rural populations; 
between younger and older generations; and between expert-led, evidence-
informed governance and bottom-up citizen participation – must ultimately be 
overcome if the viability and sustainability of the Netherlands’ democratic 
society is to be ensured. This means there must be a simultaneous political 
focus on substantive policy issues, implementation gaps and political issues 
such as stricter rule-of-law monitoring and innovative modes of democracy. 
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  At the national level, the Dutch political-party landscape is more fragmented 
than ever, with relatively moderate polarization on economic issues and 
substantial polarization on cultural issues. In particular, debates related to 
immigration, multiculturalism and the social integration of ethnic minorities 
are particularly polarized.  
 
Following the 2017 electoral results, several existing trends combined to 
increase political polarization: the Rutte II coalition cabinet that comprised the 
conservative-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), and 
the Labor Party (PvdA) lost heavily; the number of effective political parties in 
parliament reached an all-time high; the three main centrist political parties – 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), PvdA and VVD – won fewer 
parliamentary seats than ever; electoral volatility was only higher in 2002 
when Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) entered parliament with a stunning 24 seats; and 
left-wing political parties won an all-time low of only 42 parliamentary seats, 
having lost a combined 20 seats. Volatility and fragmentation is primarily 
caused by voters having a greater choice of closely related political parties. 
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For example, voters can choose between a confessional set of three parties 
(i.e., CDA, SGP and CU), a socioeconomically moderate right-wing set of 
three parties (i.e., VVD, CDA and D66) and a progressive left-wing set of five 
parties (i.e., PvdA, D66, GreenLeft, Socialist Party and Party for the Animals 
(PvdD)), in addition to a cluster of outsider parties (e.g., PvdD and PVV) and 
several newcomers (50PLUS, DENK and Forum for Democracy). Of the new 
parties, 50PLUS appeals to discontented pensioners; DENK appeals to well-
educated, typically young voters of Turkish and Moroccan descent; and Forum 
for Democracy, which surprised many by winning the 2019 provincial 
elections and entering the Senate as the second-largest party, appeals to 
culturally conservative, younger voters with anti-elite and anti-Europe 
sentiments. 
 
Ideological polarization on the economic left-right dimension is moderate. 
Over the last 25 years, Dutch voters have held relatively stable preferences on 
issues such as income inequality and redistribution, taxation, and the economy. 
In 2019, the inequality issue regained a high level of prominence in party and 
governmental politics. However, on the cultural dimension several issues have 
seen substantial shifts in public opinion. In particular, public opinions on 
immigration, integration and European unification have become more 
negative. Even in one of the most proportional representative systems in the 
world, with very few entry restrictions on new political parties, about a third of 
the electorate – disproportionately in the lower-income and lower educational 
attainment brackets – feel there is no party they can sufficiently identify with. 
Competition for these voters may have resulted in more inter-group 
polarization among political parties (on issues like immigration, religion and 
education), and has manifested itself in impolite, harsh and frequently 
insulting statements by politicians in the press, on social media and even in 
parliamentary debates. This has also resulted in lower levels of public trust in 
the major political institutions and parties, and in particular politicians.  
 
At the national level, the record number of days required to form the four-
party Rutte III cabinet is a sign of political fragmentation making government 
formation and policymaking more difficult. In its latter days, the Rutte II 
cabinet lost its majority in the Second Chamber but remained capable of 
governing through the formation of ad hoc majorities in the Senate, a situation 
that has reoccurred since June 2019. Fragmentation and polarization appear to 
be much more of a policymaking problem at the level of local politics and 
administration. Fragmentation is worse at the municipal level because local 
political parties have won well over a third of the total number of seats in local 
councils, resulting in a large influx of relatively inexperienced politicians with 
radical political agendas. Frequent political-party schisms at the local level 
also make the formation of working majorities more difficult to achieve and 
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result in longer periods for local-government formation. National political 
parties, at both extremes of the political spectrum, managed to win a 
considerable share of municipal council seats. At the local level, one 
frequently observes issue linkages of traditional issues (e.g., parking spots in 
cities or social housing with “preferential treatment” of refugees) and 
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 The Dutch economy grew by 2.8% in 2018, the sixth consecutive year of 
considerable positive economic growth. Overall, conventional indicators of the 
economic cycle are performing well – indeed, they are the highest among EU 
member states, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2019. Trust indicators for business and 
consumers have declined from a peak in early 2018, but (in December 2018) 
are still quite optimistic.  
 
The economy’s international standing has been steady, with the Netherlands 
ranking fourth out of 141 countries in the 2019 GCR,   only behind Hong 
Kong, the United States and Singapore. The Netherlands scores highly in the 
areas of macroeconomic stability, health, infrastructure quality and business 
dynamism. However, its performance has slightly declined with respect to 
infrastructure, labor-force skill levels, product-market efficiency (especially 
the complexity of tariffs) and innovation capability.  
 
In sum, although the Netherlands was caught in a long-term slump, strong 
economic recovery since 2013 has now led to a booming economy. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the euro zone, Dutch economic performance is 
average. Political debate on economic policy has turned strongly toward issues 
of inequality, and especially the well-documented fact that in spite of the 
country’s satisfactory macroeconomic performance and well-balanced state 
budget, Dutch households have yet to experience serious improvements in 
recent years with regard to consumption spending and quality of life. 
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 In July 2019, 3.3% of the working population was unemployed, down from 
3.9% the year before. The youth unemployment rate was 8.9% in June 2017, 
declining to 7.2% in July 2018. Nevertheless, some observers consider youth 
unemployment to be a serious threat to the country’s long-term prospects. An 
estimated 138,000 young people are not in education or employment. Youth 
unemployment rates are twice as high among those without an official 
qualification and among those with a migration background. A large 
proportion of those young people lack a basic level of literacy, computer 
literacy or technical craft skills. Better educational and school-to-work 
transitional arrangements are crucial. Other labor-market weaknesses include 
relatively low labor-market participation rates among migrants, especially 
young migrants; an increasingly two-tiered labor market that separates 
(typically older) “insiders” with significant job security and (old and young) 
“outsiders,” who are often “independent workers,” lack employment 
protection and have little to no job security; and high levels of workplace 
pressure. Although the proportion of fixed jobs surpassed flexible jobs in 
2017, the flexibilization of jobs remains a highly salient trend. As of 2018, the 
ratio of flexible to fixed jobs was 40% flexible to 60% fixed, while in 2003 it 
was 25% to 75%. The majority of 15- to 25-year-old employees work flexible 
jobs, with a ratio of 27:73 in 2018, compared to 45:55 in 2003. In Europe this 
makes the Netherlands an outlier in terms of work flexibilization. This 
“dualization” of the labor market between well-protected older workers and 
less protected younger ones is attributed to government policy; for firms, 
flexible workers are financially much more attractive (ceteris paribus by as 
much as 7% in labor costs) than are workers with fixed contracts. An OECD 
report judges the Dutch labor-market situation as being problematic in the long 
run, because firms will invest less in the education of their flexible workers, 
thereby threatening the long-term labor productivity of the economy as a 
whole. In late 2018, the government established an independent expert 
commission tasked with designing policies that would align labor law, social 
security and fiscal policies with a view to redesigning the labor market to 
benefit all workers in a sustainable national economy. 
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 Taxation policy in the Netherlands still addresses the trade-off between equity 
and competitiveness reasonably well. Looking at average income, pre-taxes in 
the Netherlands have a Gini coefficient of 0.563 (in 2015), after-taxes (and 
other redistributive measures) it is only 0.295 (in 2015). However, including 
wealth, the Gini index jumps to 0.92. The Netherlands has a progressive 
system of income taxation which contributes to vertical equity. In general, 
income-tax rates range between 30% for lower and 52% for higher income 
levels. There is a separate tax for wealth. Lower-income groups are affected 
most significantly by indirect taxes and local taxes. Yet, tax pressure for every 
income group, from low to high, is allegedly approximately 37%. Yet partly as 
a result of ad hoc measures to alleviate crisis impacts, the tax system loses 
credibility because of its increasingly unequal treatment of different groups. 
For example, between self-employed and employed workers, between 
entrepreneurs operating as sole traders or private limited companies, between 
single-parent families and families where both parents earn a living, and 
between small savers and the very wealthy. There is more inequality than 
meets the eye. In particular, middle-income families only manage to make 
ends meet because women are working more; increasing the number of hours 
worked per household and the female labor participation rate.  
 
It appears that the general political mood definitively switched 2018 – 2019 
from a focus on austerity and budget balancing to one on reducing inequality 
and unsustainability. The Council of State calculated that collective tax 
burdens on citizens and firms had increased by 2.7% to 39.6% of GDP since 
2015, despite the government’s plans to reduce taxes. All political parties 
expressed concerns about the stagnation of middle-class incomes, the high 
rates of taxes on labor, the excessive size of CEO salaries, tax evasion by 
multinational corporations, and the lack of fiscal incentives for housing, 
innovation and sustainable (economic) projects.  
 
Corporate income tax for foreign companies – an aspect of the trade-off 
between horizontal equity and competitiveness – has also come under more 
intense political scrutiny. An extensive treaty network that encompasses 90 tax 
treaties aims at protecting foreign companies from paying too much tax, 
effectively makes the Netherlands a tax haven, a view that even the OECD and 
the European Parliament have expressed. 




WRR, Economic inequality in the Netherlands in 8 figures, 2014 (Rijksoverheid, consulted 23 October 
2018) 
 
CBS, Parade van Pen: de vermogensverdeling in 2015, 8 July, 2017 (consulted 23 October 2018) 
 
NRC-Handelsblad, 22 June 2019. Wie verliest dit: de VVD, Rutte, de grote bedrijven of de grootverdieners? 
 






 Although budgetary policy has considerably improved over the last few years 
due to strong economic growth, worries remain over its long-term 
sustainability. In both 2019 and 2020, there is/will be a projected budget 
surplus (respectively of 1.2% and 0.3% GDP). Overall government debt is 
expected to fall to 47.7% of GDP, well under the EU norm of 60%. The long-
term structural budget, which showed a surplus of 0.3% GDP in 2019, was 
projected to shift to a deficit of 0.4% of GDP in 2020 – just inside the 
maximum allowable deficit of 0.5% of GDP. The government has chosen to 
change its own rules of budgetary policy by stretching its expense ceiling and 
income framework due to additional financial burdens deriving from policy 
successes, including the pension agreement, the climate agreement and the 
push for more housing and investment. Both the Council of State and the 
Center for Economic Policy Analysis have criticized the government for its 
expansive budgetary policy due to the of lack state income from gas sales, and 
because the government’s extra spending on defense, security, care and 
education violates the prudential budgetary rule (which states that windfalls 
may not be used to finance new structural policies). The government, however, 
views its budgetary policy as an investment in future economic growth. 
Promised risk-assessment procedures for budget policy have been delayed, 
despite the serious risk factors in the global economy (Brexit, trade conflicts) 
and the high probability of a new recession in the near future. The national 
budgetary system has also been criticized because national budget cuts are 
proportionally allocated to local-government budgets even though national 
policy has in recent years burdened local governments with new tasks (e.g., 
youth and elderly care) without structural budget compensations. Ad hoc 
nationwide increases have not diminished the volatility of local-government 
budgets. Overall, local-government budgets will decline despite the lasting 
period economic prosperity. 
 
From the perspective of democratic and public accountability, the General 
Accountability Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) has warned since 2016 that an 
ever-larger share of nationally collected taxes (fully two-thirds in 2019) is 
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actually spent without any parliamentary budgetary oversight. Provincial and 
local governments, independent public organizations like schools and 
universities, the police, the executive agency for employee insurances (UWV), 
the Social Insurance Bank (SVB), other social funds, and the EU all spend tax 
money under much restricted or fragmented accountability arrangements. 
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Research, Innovation and Infrastructure 
R&I Policy 
Score: 9 
 In 2019, the European Innovation Scoreboard has the Netherlands as an 
innovation leader, ranked fourth after Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The 
country was additionally ranked fourth out of 141 countries in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019, and was the most 
competitive in Europe.  
 
Direct government expenditure on R&D is increasing, but lags behind the 
projected rise in gross domestic product. Direct government expenditure on 
R&D rose from €5.0 billion in 2017 to €5.6 billion in 2018, and is forecast to 
remain at around €5.5 billion over the medium term. Despite this increase, it is 
expected to fall after 2018, from 0.67% of GDP in 2017 to 0.65% in 2023. 
This is because budgeted government spending on R&D is not growing as fast 
as the economy. Between 2014 and 2017, government, the business enterprise 
sector and other investors together spent a total of 2.0% of GDP on R&D. 
Direct government R&D expenditure is in line with the average for the EU-28 
(the entire EU), but lower than a number of reference countries such as 
Germany, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. To achieve the target 
of 2.5% of GDP by 2020, both the public and the business enterprise sectors 
will have to invest more. For the first time since 2010, research-specific 
program funding for applied research organizations has increased, thanks to 
investments provided for under the coalition agreement. TNO’s program 
funding has shown the sharpest increase. Other policy-driven research 
expenditure is also increasing, mainly owing to additional funding from the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy. However, the size of the 
expenditure (€875 million in 2019) is nowhere near the €1.1 billion spent in 
2010. Compared with other OECD countries, a large proportion of government 
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support for R&D consists of tax-based measures (0.17% of GDP). In addition 
to the national government, the European Union plays an important role in 
funding R&D and innovation. Researchers affiliated with Dutch institutions 
have so far received more than €3 billion in funding from the EU’s Horizon 
2020 Framework Program, in the range of €600 million to €700 million per 
year.  
All in all, it is unclear whether the Netherland’s R&D performance is due to 
government policies (coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Climate). The country’s policymakers aim to ensure that the Netherlands is 
one of the top five global knowledge economies, and to increase public and 
non-public R&D investments to 2.5% of GDP (€650 billion). Total 
expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP is stuck at 2%, lower than the 
EU target of 3%. 
 
Citation:  
Rathenau Instituut, Voorpublicatie Totale Investeringen in Wetenschap en Innovatie (TWIN) 2017-2023, 
(rathenau.nl, accessed 1 November, 2019) 
 
European Commission, Innovation Union Scoreboard 2019 (ec.europa.eu, accessed 1 November 2019) 
 
World Economic Forum,The Global Competitiveness Report 2018 (reports.weforum.org, accessed 24 
October 2018) 
 










 The Netherlands is slowly but surely losing its position in the important bodies 
that together shape the global financial architecture. In EU policymaking in the 
past, the Dutch tended to agree with the UK position in principle, but follow 
the German position in practice. After all, as a small but internationally 
significant export economy, the Dutch have a substantial interest in a sound 
international financial and legal architecture. However, given the wave of 
political skepticism toward international affairs, as exemplified by no-votes in 
the EU constitution and the 2016 Ukraine referendums, the Dutch have until 
recently been regarded more as reluctant followers than as proactive initiators 
or agenda setters. However, threatened now by inegalitarian American-style 
capitalism and Chinese post-totalitarian state capitalism, the EU has become 
increasingly important to its member states’ political self-defense. In 2019, 
Dutch policymakers too rather suddenly adopted this stance, although its 
translation into policy initiatives has remained slow and somewhat hesitant. 
Nevertheless, after a decade or so, they finally seem ready to support a 
stronger Europe. 
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Recent statements by Prime Minister Rutte (Conservative Liberal, VVD) 
regarding Macron’s plans for revitalizing the EU project clearly signal 
increased rapprochement with the French. Minister of Development and Trade 
Sigrid Kaag (Liberal Democrat, D66) has openly called for a stronger, more 
unified EU. The center-right Dutch government openly supported Frans 
Timmermans’ (Labor Party) failed bid to succeed Jean-Claude Juncker as 
chair of the European Commission. And even Finance Minister Wopke 
Hoekstra (Christian Democrat, CDA) has publically advocates for stronger 
EU, although one under German leadership. Nevertheless, even now that the 
European Court has ruled that the Netherlands ought to reduce opportunities 
for international tax evasion, Hoekstra has been reluctant to deal with gross 
inequalities in the fiscal treatment of foreign and domestic capital. In addition, 
he has ignored an advisory report by the Scientific Council of Government 
Policy (WRR) opining that the Dutch government did not intervene strongly 
enough after the financial crisis of 2008, and that it should now create a public 
savings bank and foster more competitiveness in the sector overall. 
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 In terms of quality, the average education attainment level for the population is 
high, somewhat exceeding the OECD average in 2017 and in 2018. The 
Ministry of Education follows a policy in which individual schools publish 
their pupils’ performance (as measured by the School Inspectorate), enabling 
parents to choose the best or most appropriate school for their children. 
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Quality-improvement policies – including CITO testing, performance 
monitoring, efforts to intensify and improve teacher professionalization 
programs, better transition trajectories between school types, and quality-
management systems at school level – do not yet appear to be effective. The 
shift seen in recent years toward a focus on systemic issues – streaming at an 
early age, efficiency of centralized testing, inclusive education and so on – 
seemed in 2019 to be replaced by efforts to address the acute shortage of 
teachers and to reform education-funding models, particularly for higher 
education.  
 
The Netherlands continues to struggle with achieving equity in educational 
access. Although the school performance of pupils of non-Dutch origin has 
improved over time (in part due to a rise in non-native adults’ educational 
achievements), these children on average do far less well in science, reading 
and math than their Dutch-origin peers. Moreover, the gap in this regard is 
considerably larger than the average within OECD countries. Social 
background and parents’ level of educational attainment are increasingly 
predictive of students’ educational achievements. For all pupils, 
socioeconomic/cultural background determines school performance to a 
degree above OECD averages; this is particularly true for secondary education 
(i.e., after pupils have been tracked at age 12). The growing gap between 
higher education and secondary-level vocational education reflects differences 
in socioeconomic status and ethnic backgrounds. The issue of school 
segregation is still on the agenda. The protected status accorded religious 
education in the Netherlands (under which religious schools are financed as 
public schools) again became a point of discussion due to serious problems 
with several Islamic schools. 
 
Equitable access to education for minority ethnic groups has not been achieved 
and is worsening at the university level. There remain considerable gender 
gaps in education. The teaching workforce is primarily female, except in 
tertiary education. The proportion of women studying science, technology, 
engineering, mathematics, manufacturing and construction is low, while 
women are overrepresented in the education, healthcare and welfare sectors. In 
an attempt to close this gap, the University of Eindhoven announced a 
controversial temporary policy under which it would only hire women to fill 
academic staff vacancies.  
.  
In 2018, because of the increased demand for technically educated 
professionals, secondary professional schools received extra financing, while 
measures to improve the image of the schools and the status of the students 
were introduced.  
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Children with minor learning disabilities often get caught in a bureaucratic 
back-and-forth between mainstream schools and specialized youth-care 
services. Since both sectors have struggled with financial cuts and staff 
shortages, cooperation between the schools and youth services has left 
considerable room for improvement.  
 
At the tertiary level, the system of equal access through study grants has been 
abolished and every student now pays for university education, with low-
interest loans available to students. Calculations suggest that university fees 
will result in an average lifetime income loss of 0.2% for tertiary-level 
students. The deterrence effect of the new student loan system has proven to 
be more substantial among lower-income families, particularly at the higher-
professional level. The trend of growing student debt continues this year as 
well.  
 
The Dutch school system stresses efficiency in terms of resource allocation. 
Expenditure for education is below the average for OECD countries. Among 
primary and secondary-level school teachers, following massive strikes in 
2017, salaries were significantly increased in 2018, and will be further 
increased in 2019 and 2020. However, this does not seem to be enough to meet 
the substantial shortage of teachers. The Council of Education suggested that 
the system of teacher certification needs to be drastically changed to address 
the issue. For now, the government has invested an additional €460 million in 
primary and secondary education, without making systemic changes.  
 
Relatively high levels of education attainment and school performance in the 
Netherlands should theoretically have a positive impact on the country’s 
competitiveness. However, although the Netherlands remains competitive in 
certain areas, the country’s track-based school system makes it difficult to 
adapt quickly to changing labor-market needs. As a result, the country faces a 
shortage of skilled technical workers. Lifelong learning is poorly supported by 
the government. Moreover, the growing gap between higher education and 
secondary-level vocational education reflects differences in students’ 
socioeconomic status and ethnic backgrounds. This gap results in stagnating 
salaries for persons with vocational educations as opposed to increasing 
incomes for specialists with higher-level educational qualifications. 
 
In January 2016, the national dialogue on a reformed “curriculum for the 
future” for primary and secondary education received substantial input. 
Teachers and school managers worked together on a new curriculum. The 
ambition to establish three broad knowledge domains was watered down to a 
collaborative development of specific teaching material in the third phase of 
the process in the fall of 2018. In a new initiative, participating teachers 
SGI 2020 | 20  Netherlands Report 
 
produced a number of plans and suggestions that were presented to the 
minister of education in October 2019, along with advice for a thorough 
revision of the main objectives of education.  
  
In the higher-level vocational training and university education sectors, 
inadequate government funding exacerbates existing challenges resulting from 
increasing student numbers (particularly of international students), work 
pressures and quality issues. In September 2019, a committee recommended 
reform of the higher-education financing model. The most controversial aspect 
of this report was the recommendation to increase funding of the sciences and 
technical studies, with perceived negative consequences for the humanities and 
medical and social studies.  
 
As in other countries, teacher shortages are producing substantial problems. 
This problem even worsened in 2019 (despite efforts to reverse the trend), 
particularly at the primary level, and in certain lower-level vocational 
education settings (VMBO/MBO). 
   
In the years ahead, many teachers will be retiring, while the number of new 
teachers being trained is declining (especially in the hard sciences). Over time, 
this will exacerbate existing shortages. 
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 Income inequality in the Netherlands produces a score of between 0.28 and 
0.29 on the Gini Index, and has not changed significantly since 2007. 
However, the difference between top-level incomes and lower end incomes 
has increased. Top salaries increased by 32% between 2010 and 2017, while 
lower end salaries increased by 13%. Consequently, the gap between the top 
and bottom incomes increased from a factor of 5.5 in 2010 to a factor of 6.2 in 
2017. The gap is slightly lower when net incomes are compared, but is rising 
nevertheless. Interestingly, this pattern is even more visible in the incomes of 
women. While the incomes of the highest-earning women increased 
significantly, particularly for younger women, only one-quarter of all women 
are in full-time employment. Since 2016, of the country’s home-owning 
households, almost 1.4 million (32%) had mortgage debts higher than the 
market value of their house. This number is now rapidly declining due to a rise 
in house prices. The average age of first-time home buyers has increased due 
to precarious incomes; stricter loan regulations; increasing house prices and a 
shortage of new, affordable houses. 
 
Gender-based income inequality is high. On average, personal incomes among 
men (€40,200) are much higher than personal incomes among women 
(€23,800). This gap is gradually closing among younger women, however.  
 
Women still form a slight majority of people living in poverty. Half of all 
people living at or under the poverty level have a migrant background. Persons 
working as independent contractors within low-wage sectors constitute a 
relatively new at-risk group. Young people also appear to be at risk, as a 
combination of student debt, flexible employment with uncertain incomes, and 
rising housing prices has kept them living at their parents’ houses for longer 
than previous generations.  
 
As care services increasingly take on a digital component, access is becoming 
increasingly problematic for a large group of citizens. While many people are 
able to take advantage of electronic services, a significant proportion of people 
experience problems due to the lack of personal contact or a failure to 
understand their options and opportunities. This includes students and young 
parents as well as elderly or uneducated people. Loneliness and a lack of social 
connection are emerging as serious concerns, not only among the elderly, but 
among young people as well, particularly students.  
 
Compared to other EU member states, the number of Dutch households at risk 
of social exclusion or poverty is still low. But since 2008, the beginning of the 
economic crisis, poverty in the Netherlands has increased by one-third. Single-
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parent families, ethnic-minority families, migrants, divorcees and those 
dependent on social benefits are overrepresented in this poverty-exposed 
income bracket. Since 2014, the risk of poverty is declining faster among 
migrants than among the general population. Of young people under 18 years 
old, 17% were at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion. However, in big 
cities, such as The Hague and Amsterdam, with large immigrant communities, 
this proportion increases to one in five. However, the risk of poverty and 
social exclusion in the Netherlands as a whole is just 15% (comparable to 
Sweden only), which means that around 2.5 million people face relative 
poverty. It should also be noted that the poverty threshold in the Netherlands is 
far higher than in most other EU member states (with the exception of 
Luxembourg). Responsibility for poverty policy in the Netherlands is largely 
held by municipal governments. Given the budgetary side effects of other 
decentralization policies, there are clear signs of risk for poverty policy, both 
in terms of quality and accessibility. 
 
Since 2015, municipalities have been responsible for assisting people with 
disabilities in finding suitable work. The number o  f young persons with 
disabilities who have a job has increased by 9%, but their incomes have on 
average worsened due to a combination of low earnings and benefit cuts. 
Older people saw their opportunities for employment decrease under the new 
law. The policies remain complex and encourage cream-skimming practices, 
thereby excluding people in comparatively greater need of assistance. The 
same decentralized approach has been adopted for the implementation of the 
UN agreement on the rights of disabled people. A study of 47 Dutch 
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 The Netherlands’ hybrid healthcare system continues to be subject to 
controversy and declining consumer/patient trust. The latest decline in trust 
has been fueled by the continuing trend of hospital bankruptcies. The system, 
in which the country’s few large health insurance companies have been tasked 
with cost containment on behalf of patients (and the state), is turning into a 
bureaucratic quagmire. Psychotherapists, family doctors and other healthcare 
workers have rebelled against overwhelming bureaucratic regulation that cuts 
into time available for primary tasks. With individual obligatory copayment 
levels raised to €375 (including for the chronically ill and individuals with low 
incomes), patients are demanding more transparency in hospital bills; these are 
currently based on average costs per treatment, thereby cross-subsidizing 
costlier treatments through the overpricing of standard treatments. The rate of 
defaults on healthcare premiums to insurance companies and bills to hospitals 
and doctors is increasing. All this means that the system’s cost efficiency is 
coming under serious policy and political scrutiny.  
 
In terms of cost efficiency, according to the new System of Health Accounts, 
the Dutch spend 15.4% of GDP on healthcare, or €5,535 per capita. According 
to the OECD Health at a Glance 2019 report, total expenditure is 9.9% of 
GDP. When both government spending and private spending are combined, 
the total costs of care show a steady increase since 2014, exceeding the rate of 
inflation. The steepest increase is in specialized medical care in hospitals, with 
long-term care showing some decrease. Moreover, the number of people 
employed in healthcare was lower than in previous years. Labor productivity 
in healthcare rose by 0.6% on an annual basis, with the gains coming almost 
entirely in hospital care. Profits for general practitioners, dentists and medical 
specialists in the private sector increased much more than general non-health 
business profits. 
 
A proportion of healthcare costs are simply transferred to individual patients 
by increasing the obligatory copayment associated with health insurance. One 
means of improving patients’ cost awareness is through increasing 
transparency within healthcare institutions (e.g., by providing mortality and 
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success rates rankings for certain treatments per hospital). However, patients 
are not able to choose their treatment centers freely, but are forced to choose 
from institutions that contract directly with their insurance company. 
 
In terms of quality and inclusiveness, the system remains satisfactory. Rates of 
private insurance coverage remain high, but with a slightly decreasing trend 
since 2007. Rates of dental coverage are quite low at 11%, resulting in 
considerable income-related differences in dental care. A total of 12.4 % of the 
population postpones or forgoes medical treatment due to limited availability, 
while just 5.8% forgoes medical treatment because of affordability concerns, 
the lowest such rate in the OECD, although with a significant gap between 
those with lower incomes (a 20% rate) and higher incomes.  
 
However, Dutch medical care does not achieve the highest scores in any of the 
easily measured health indicators. Average life expectancy (80.2 years for 
males, 83.3 for women) and health-status self-evaluations have remained 
largely unchanged over recent years. Patient satisfaction is high (averaging 
between 7.7 and 7.9 on a 10-point scale), especially among elderly and lower-
educated patients. However, patient safety in hospitals is a rising concern for 
both the general public and the Health Inspectorate. Since 2013, waiting lists 
for specialist care have been a growing concern. This trend continued through 
2018, particularly for age-related conditions, and was particularly notable 
among some regions in the country with aging and decreasing populations. 
The situation in the psychiatric care sector are particularly troublesome. 
Recently, general practitioners have also expressed grave concerns about 
rising work pressures, staff shortages and time-consuming bureaucracy.  
 
The level of inclusiveness is very high for the elderly in long-term healthcare, 
in spite of the fact that the sector is struggling with staff shortages, resulting in 
high employee turnover and absentee rates. However, there is a glaring 
inequality that the healthcare system cannot repair. The number of drug 
prescriptions issued is much lower for high-income groups than for low-
income groups. People with high and low income levels show a difference of 
18 years in terms of overall healthy life years. The difference in life 
expectancies between those with higher and lower levels of education is also 
growing, with this difference at five years for men and more than four for 
women. Recent research has also revealed considerable regional differences 
with regard to rates of chronic illnesses and high-burden diseases; differences 
in age composition and education only partially explain these differences.  
 
In the area of disease prevention, a number of observers have deemed the 
national prevention agreement to be unsatisfactory, retaining too much 
influence by the tobacco, alcohol and food industries. 
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 Family policy in the Netherlands is formally characterized by the need to 
recognize a child’s best interest and to provide support for the family and the 
development of parenting skills. According to EU-28 data, the Dutch spend 
approximately 32% of GDP on social protections (healthcare, old age, 
housing, unemployment, family), but just 4% of this is spent on family costs 
(compared to an EU-28 average of 8%). Day care centers for young children 
are becoming a luxury item, as they are not directly subsidized and parents 
face a steep increase in costs based on higher contributions for higher taxable 
income. This situation was somewhat alleviated at the beginning of 2018, 
when community and commercial providers of childcare were subjected to the 
same quality criteria and the same financial regime. The childcare subsidy was 
significantly increased in 2019, with an additional increase slated for 2020. 
Nevertheless, the cost and availability of day care varies substantially, 
depending on local municipal policies.  
 
The government has established an extensive child protection system through 
its policy of municipal “close to home” youth and family centers, which are 
tasked with establishing a system of digital information related to parenting, 
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education and healthcare. Nevertheless, parents complain of a lack of 
information about and access to youth and family centers. Local governments 
have in some cases violated decision-making privacy rules in the allocation of 
youth-care assistance. In recent years, there were several scandals involving 
the death of very young children due to parental abuse as a result of 
uncoordinated and/or belated interventions by youth-care organizations.  
 
The devolution of powers in youth healthcare to local governments in 2016 
resulted in cases where necessary psychiatric care was withheld or 
significantly delayed due to a lack of financing. Vulnerable children were 
particularly hard hit by the decentralization and fragmentation of services, 
which led to longer waiting times. Other issues included travel to healthcare 
facilities and coordination between services. For the first time since 
decentralization in 2015, the number of children and young adults in youth 
care declined significantly, by 11,000. Notwithstanding, the total number of 
children in youth care remains high, and stands at approximately one in 10 
children. Against the backdrop of a permanent shortage of funding at the 
municipal level, it is not clear whether preventive efforts are effective or 
parents are simply opting out of the system and choosing private providers 
instead. In 2019, a wave of care-provider bankruptcies gave further fuel to 
critics of the decentralization effort, particularly as it was combined with 
severe financial cuts. The government now instead recommends regional 
cooperation and some centralization.  
 
In practice, child support for families also is an instrument designed to 
improve parents’ labor-market participation. Enabling a work-family balance 
is less of a guiding policy principle. The gap between professional women 
working longer hours and less educated women not participating in the labor 
market is growing. Almost two-thirds of mid-career women experience the 
combination of childcare tasks and work as difficult. Full-time female labor-
force participation is hindered mainly by a high marginal effective tax burden 
on second earners, reflecting the withdrawal of social benefits according to 
family income. Consequently, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender 
Gap Index 2017, the Netherlands ranked 32 out of 144 countries, having 
ranked 16 in 2016 and 9 out of 130 countries in 2008. The drop was largely 
due to the inclusion of top incomes in the calculations, which revealed a 
glaring absence of women in highly paid positions in the country. Other 
factors include unfavorable school times, a childcare system geared toward 
part-time work, and the volatility of financing for and poor access to care 
policies, particularly at the municipal level. Recently, the government 
announced plans to increase parental leave significantly, including paternal 
leave for fathers, in an effort to address these difficulties. A pilot project with 
flexible school times was prolonged, and expanded to include more schools. 
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 The Dutch work fewer hours and retire later than people in other EU member 
states. The average pension age has increased from 61 years in 2007 to 64 
years and 10 months in 2017. The proportion of people aged between 60 and 
65 still active in the labor market has almost doubled since 2005.  
 
The Dutch pension system is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the basic, 
state-run old-age pension (AOW) that provides benefits for people 66 years 
old and older. Everyone under 66 who pays Dutch wage tax and/or income tax 
pays into the AOW system. The system may be considered a “pay-as-you-go” 
system. This pillar makes up only a limited part of the total old-age pension 
system. Because the current number of pensioners will double over the next 
few decades, the system is subject to considerable and increasing pressure. 
The second pillar consists of obligatory occupational pension schemes that 
supplement the AOW scheme. Both employees and employers are obliged to 
contribute. In this way, the pension scheme covers all employees of a given 
company and industry/sector. The third pillar comprises supplementary 
personal pension schemes that anyone can buy from insurance companies. 
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Many self-employed people (who number more than 1.2 million in the 
Netherlands) do not opt for a pension package, as this is not yet compulsory. 
Previously, self-employed people often had a short history in the conventional 
labor market that gave them some pension; however, most newly self-
employed or freelance people today do not have any pension scheme 
whatever. 
 
Although the system is considered the world’s best after those in Denmark and 
Australia, it – like most European systems – is vulnerable to demographic 
changes related to an aging population, as well as to disturbances in 
international financial markets. This is because pension funds, driven by the 
need to meet their growing financial obligations, are large players in stock 
markets. As of 2013, the government gradually increased the age of AOW 
pension eligibility to 66 by 2018, with a further increase to 67 by 2021. For 
supplementary pension schemes, the retirement age rose to 67 in 2014. During 
the review period, further increases in the retirement age were capped, and 
concessions were made for people engaged in physically demanding jobs. Due 
to the fact that the actual average retirement age is significantly lower that the 
legal level of 65, the average retirement age is continuing to rise.  
 
Due to the very low interest-rate levels, pension-fund assets, although still 
enormous (totaling €660 billion or 193% of GDP), have not grown in 
proportion to the number of pensioners. The liquidity ratio of pension funds 
must be maintained at a minimum threshold of 105%. The time period given 
for recovery after failing to meet this threshold was increased by the Dutch 
central bank from three to a maximum of five years. Nevertheless, quite a few 
pension-insurance companies are at risk of having to lower their benefits. 
Interim framework bills for strengthening the governance of pension funds 
(e.g., requirements for the indexation of pension benefits, the inclusion of 
pensioners on governing boards, and the use of oversight commissions and 
comparative monitoring practices) were adopted by parliament in the summer 
of 2014.  
 
A more definitive reform of the Dutch pension system is still pending. Debate 
focuses on the redistributive impacts (on the poor and rich, young and older, 
high and low education) and on the creation of more flexible pension schemes 
that give individuals more choice opportunities versus retaining collectively 
managed pension schemes. The government is still considering long-term 
retirement policies, hoping that its social partners, employers’ organizations 
and trade unions in the Socioeconomic Council will work out a compromise. 
In 2019, the long-due retirement-plan agreement was finally signed, but was 
immediately called into question by the financial sector due to extremely low 
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interest rates. For now, actual pension cuts in the coming year have been 
avoided, but the issue remains a political hot potato. 
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 The Netherlands is a sizable immigration-destination country, with a 
considerable integration task. In 2018, 12% of the population were first-
generation immigrants. In 2011, the Netherlands ranked 5 out of 37 industrial 
countries in the Migrant Integration Policy Index; in 2015, the county ranked 
15. The country scores relatively high on measures of labor mobility and 
access to citizenship for migrants, but low on measures of access to family 
reunion and permanent residence. It attains average scores for criteria such as 
education, anti-discrimination policy, health outcomes and political 
participation. The relative success of DENK, a newly established political 
party that claims to promote tolerance, is a sign that ethnic minorities do not 
feel adequately represented by mainstream political parties.  
 
In a 2018 representative public opinion poll on immigration and integration 
issues, 38% of respondents spontaneously stated that immigration, integration 
and racism were the second most important public concern, after healthcare. In 
view of occasional riots and disturbances at municipal council meetings on the 
location of refugee settlements, integration issues flared up again. At the local 
elections in March 2017, national and local parties with anti-immigration 
agendas gained seats in municipal councils across the country, often for the 
first time. However, apart from the occasional provocation, they have not 
managed to initiate a substantial debate on the issue of integration. Although 
the dominant concern during the review period seemed to be over growing 
levels of income inequality, there are still widely shared concerns over 
growing polarization and radicalization on both sides of the political spectrum.  
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Since 2009, all non-EU nationals who migrate to the Netherlands are required 
to learn Dutch and essential facts about Dutch society. The Civic Integration 
Abroad policy involves obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for 
family-reunion applicants. Refugees are expected to “deserve” their status in 
the Netherlands by taking language tests, and many refugees accumulate debt 
paying for language courses, which are also difficult to find and are often of 
unreliable quality. Migrants without refugee status are allowed to take a loan 
of up to €10,000 to pay for their integration, to be repaid within three years. 
The many problems with this system will be addressed by a new law in 2020. 
 
Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures 
targeting employment and labor-market integration. Nevertheless, 
unemployment rates among non-Western migrants are three times as high 
(16%) as among Dutch-born citizens (under 4% at the end of 2018). This 
difference is somewhat less pronounced within the 15 to 24 age group but 
remains twice as high. One in three young migrants without a formal school 
qualification is unemployed. Second- and third-generation migrants are less 
likely to find employment and earn significantly less than their native-born 
counterparts – up to 20% less for men and up to 35% for women. Recent 
research shows that ethnic discrimination in the labor market is widespread 
and difficult to address. Muslim citizens self-report experiences with and 
perceptions of discrimination, as well as incidents of harassment and violence, 
at levels quite high by comparison with other European counties. Rampant 
discrimination, racism and Islamophobia in the police force were recently 
revealed by a series of whistleblowers in response to inadequate responses by 
top police officials. 
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 Since 2010, opinion polling has shown that confidence in the police is 
consistently high and satisfaction regarding policing performance is fairly high 
(28% of those polled express that they are “very satisfied”). Research shows 
that this is independent of the actual conduct and performance of police 
officers. The number of registered criminal incidents per capita has declined 
from 93 per 1,000 citizens in 2002 to 43 per 1,000 in 2017. The total number 
of years people have been sentenced to serve in Dutch prisons has declined 
from 12,000 in 2005 to 7,000 in 2015. At the same time, the percentage of 
resolved cases remains steady, at about 25%. A recent CBS report called this 
“the mystery of the disappearing crime.” However, this decline came to a stop 
during the review period, with a rise in sexual offenses, probably related to 
human trafficking particularly of underage subjects.  
 
Cybercrime rates (hacking, internet harassment, commercial and identity 
fraud, cyberbullying) remained stable since 2015. Illegal cryptographic 
software and phishing have become standard cybercrimes. In 2015, 11% of the 
population were victims of cybercrime, while three-quarters of cybercrime 
cases were not reported to the police. Recent studies have concluded that the 
Dutch police lack the technical expertise to effectively tackle cybercrime. A 
new study warned in 2019 of the dangers of “digital dependency” and the 
possible resulting havoc. Since 2011, the Dutch government has been 
implementing an EU-coordinated National Cybersecurity Strategy that 
prioritizes prevention over detection. Regarding terrorism threats, the 
intelligence services (Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding, established 
2004) appear able to prevent attacks. Fighting terrorism and extremism and 
anticipating political radicalization and transborder crime have gained in 
priority.  
  
There is deep concern about the infiltration of organized crime into local 
politics, business and police forces, which has resulted in an unwanted seepage 
of the illegal economy into the formal economy, along with the undermining 
of the public administration. Recently, a number of reports drew attention to 
the scale of illegal-drug production and distribution in the Netherlands and 
beyond. Synthetic drugs with an estimated street value of over €18 billion and 
marihuana production have become a structural part of Dutch economy, 
thereby creating a constant danger of spill-overs into the mainstream economy. 
In an attempt to tackle the problem, a number of municipalities have begun 
experimenting with the legalization of soft drugs.  
 
Two recent attempts (one successful) to assassinate lawyers are considered to 
be extremely alarming, as they expose the true reach of organized crime. 
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Moreover, members of the police rank and file are expressing decreasing 
confidence in their leaders, due to scandals related to racism, discrimination 
and bullying. Police spokespeople m  aintain that the citizenry’s confidence in 
the police forces remains high.  
 
The policies of the present government focus on cost reduction, and the 
centralization of the previously strictly municipal and regional police, judicial 
and penitentiary systems. In 2015, the Dutch government spent €10 billion (a 
reduction of €3 billion from 2010) on public order and safety (police, fire 
protection, disaster protection, judicial and penitentiary system). Recent 
reports indicate serious problems in implementing reforms, with police 
officers claiming severe loss of operational capacity. Meanwhile, there is 
profound discontent and unrest inside the Ministry of Justice and Safety. 
Judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other legal personnel have voiced public 
complaints about the “managerialization” of the judicial process and the 
resulting workload, leading to “sloppy” trials and verdicts. Efforts to digitize 
the judicial process, intended to reduce costs, resulted in a massive operational 
failure and a cost over-run of approximately €200 million. The government 
now intends to save €85 million in 2018 by cutting legal assistance to citizens. 
Government policy is attempting to relieve part of the burden on the judicial 
system by introducing intermediation procedures.  
 
The overall picture from the safety and security, and judicial institutions of the 
Dutch government is one of increasing stress and challenge. 
 
Citation:  
L. van der Veer et al., Vertrouwen in de politie: trends en verklaringen, Politie en Wetenschap, Apeldoorn, 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2013 
 
Criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving in 2014=8. Ontwikkelingen en samenhangen, WODC en CBS, Raad voor 
de Rechtspraak, 2015 
 
Cybersecuritymonitor 2017, CBS, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2017/06/cybersecuritymonitor-2017, 
consulted on 29 oktober 2017 
 
1.2 million cybercrime victims, CBS, 24 juli 2019 
 







Veiligheidsmonitor, 2019 ((veiligheidsmonitor.nl, consulted 3 November 2019)  
 
Jurien de Jong, Het Mysterie van verdwenen criminaliteit, Statistische Trends, CBS, Mei 2018, Den Haag 
 
Tops, P. et al, Waar een klein land groot in kan zijn. Nederland en synthetische drugs in de afgelopen 50 
jaar.The Hague 2018 
 




NRC-Handelblad, Nog hogere tekorten bij rechtspraak, 21 August 2018 
 
NRC-Handelblad, Dekker overweegt drastische hervorming rechtsbijstand, 25 September 2018 
 
Daling criminaliteitcijfers laatste halfjaar gestaakt, NOS, Jan. 17, 2019  
 








 The Netherlands’ ranking in the Center for Global Development’s 
Commitment to Development Index has risen two places since 2017, from 
seventh to fifth. In 2017, the Netherlands committed 0.60% of its GNI to 
development assistance, close to the international commitment of 0.7% GNI 
and above average for CDI countries. In addition, costs for climate policy will 
be allocated to development-aid budgets. Expenditure for international conflict 
management has been added to the diminishing state development-aid budget.  
 
Aid is no longer focused solely on poverty reduction, but also on global 
sustainable and inclusive growth, and on supporting the business of Dutch 
firms in foreign countries. The driving idea is that “economic and knowledge 
diplomacy” can forge a coalition between Dutch business-sector experts (in 
reproductive health, water management and food security/agriculture), and 
business and civil society associations in developing countries. Climate has 
been included as a key focus area, alongside poverty, migration and terrorism. 
Cutbacks in the areas of women’s rights or emergency aid have been made. 
Good-governance aid will be focused on helping developing countries to 
improve taxation systems. Following OECD guidelines, there will be a 
reassessment of the negative side effects of Dutch corporate policies in 
developing countries.  
 
The Dutch policy response to the recent refugee crisis has mimicked 
Denmark’s efforts, seeking to discourage refugees from coming to the 
Netherlands. As the general public has shown a lower degree of acceptance of 
immigration than many other countries, the country did not win internal 
support for the Franco-German refugee deal, and ultimately did not support it. 
However, the government did provide an additional €290 million for refugee 
relief in local regions. All of this shows a pattern of declining commitment by 
the Dutch government to global policy frameworks and the fair global-trading 
system. Instead, the aspiration has been to link development aid to Dutch 
national economic- and international-security interests. In 2018, these policies 
SGI 2020 | 34  Netherlands Report 
 
were partially reversed with additional funding for the education of youth and 
women in focus countries, along with some additional funds for nearby 
unstable regions.  
 
In spite of ample evidence of human trafficking and exploitation of workers, in 
some cases from poor regions within Europe, Dutch authorities have taken 
insufficient legal action against such crimes. 
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 The Rutte III government has described itself “the greenest coalition” to date, 
and put climate change on its political agenda. A Climate Act was approved by 
parliament in December 2018. Broad consultations eventually produced a 
climate agreement that set the goal of a 49% reduction in CO2 emissions by 
2020. Before the Paris Accords, the Dutch government had resisted more 
ambitious international climate goals. While the current government has 
started negotiating a new climate agreement (currently in the third round of 
negotiations), the government’s ambitions remain neatly within the boundaries 
of the Paris agreement with few specific policy measures to work with.  
   
There has been a clear policy shift in recent years toward climate adaptation. 
This appears manageable today because any adverse developments in the 
Netherlands will be gradual. The Netherlands’ natural-gas reserves have 
diminished rapidly and will necessitate gas imports from 2025 onward, despite 
decreasing demand. Meanwhile, earthquakes and soil subsidence are damaging 
houses in the northern provinces where the Dutch gas reserves are located. The 
government has introduced compensation measures for victims (still contested 
as too small). This led to the decision to stop gas production in the region by 
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2030. Consequently, all households are to be gas-free (for cooking and central 
heating) by 2050. Sustainable agriculture, particularly meat and dairy farming, 
is on the agenda and is gaining social support. Plastic is seen as a problem, but 
is dealt with largely at the municipal level, as a part of local recycling 
programs. A deposit paid by consumers on certain forms of packaging will 
eventually be introduced by 2021.  
 
The quality of air and surface water in the Netherlands remains poor, with 
intensive farming and traffic congestion the primary causes of concern, as well 
as soil salification within agricultural lands. Half of the country’s rivers, canals 
and lakes contain too much nitrogen and phosphates. Air pollution, especially 
particulate matter in the region around Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, 
is among the highest in Europe, and the concentrations of ozone and nitrogen 
dioxide are linked to a very considerable amount of premature deaths. 
 
In October 2018, the Urgenda environmental association won a major victory, 
with the Court of Appeal ruling that the government’s failure to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions significantly violated its human rights obligations. The 
verdict was upheld by the Supreme Court. In a separate case, courts rejected a 
scheme for trading future emissions in nitrogen, deeming that it failed to 
protect the environment sufficiently, and failed to assure air quality. The 
verdict effectively brought a large number of construction projects, including 
housing construction, to a halt. The reaction was to turn a focus on a primary 
culprit in this area – Dutch industrial farming, particularly livestock farming, 
which is the largest contributor to the country’s nitrogen emissions. A call to 
reduce the sector (which constitutes the second-largest meat exporter in the 
world) by half led to mass demonstrations by farmers, and even riots in some 
locations. Construction workers also protested, as their jobs viewed as being at 
risk.  
 
All in all, the government that originally called itself “green” was forced by 
these verdicts to increase the pace of its climate action, in some cases through 
the use of emergency measures. The most visible of these has been the speed-
limit reduction on highways to a maximum of 100 kilometers per hour during 
daylight hours. It remains to be seen whether the industrial farming sector will 
be affected and/or provided with compensation. These measures have become 
possible due to a gradual shift in public opinion. The discussion is no longer if 
emissions reductions will happen, but about the distribution of costs. For 
example, many have expressed a fear that the weakest shoulders will carry a 
disproportionately high burden.  
 
At the same time, the Netherlands continues to invest heavily in fossil fuels. 
Recently, the sustainability of biomass (an important element in the climate 
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agreement) has been called into doubt. The airline industry is still not paying 
its fair share with regard to the amelioration of pollution, although the 
government has pledged to to resolve this issue at the European level.  
 
Although the Netherlands is praised as a pioneer in the area of mapping and 
assessing ecosystems and their management, and on developing natural capital 
accounting systems, significant problems remain. The most serious problems 
involve habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss, atmospheric nitrogen 
deposition, desiccation and acidification. Over the last 25 years, about 140 
species inhabiting the North Sea have suffered a 30% decline, mainly due to 
recently forbidden commercial fishing techniques. 
 
With so many changes at a speed typically foreign to Dutch politics, 2019 may 
well represent a turning point in the country’s climate policy. 
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 The Dutch government has traditionally been a strong supporter of EU 
leadership in the Kyoto process of global climate policy and advancing global 
environmental protection regimes. It has also signed related international 
treaties on safety, food security, energy and international justice. The 
government continues to aspire to a coherent sustainability policy or a “policy 
agenda for globalization.” It regards resource and energy scarcity, transborder 
SGI 2020 | 37  Netherlands Report 
 
disease control, climate change, transborder crime, and international trade 
agreements as the most pressing global issues.  
 
As an immediate response, climate change is addressed mainly as a mitigation 
effort, for example, through the Dutch Risk Reduction Team, offering 
assistance and expertise to water-related risk areas around the globe. A 
coherent globalization policy also means that research is conducted and 
monitoring is performed regarding any ways that one policy may undermine 
others. In spite of this intention, Dutch reassessment of development aid 
appears to favor bilateral over multilateral global sustainability policy. For 
example, the financing of Dutch initiatives in advancing global public goods is 
no longer separately budgeted but is instead part of the diminishing 
development-aid budget.  
The Netherlands participates in efforts targeting global climate resilience that 
are focused on tapping technological innovation to reduce CO2. Bilateral 
projects with various countries outside the EU are centered on knowledge 
sharing, particularly in the area of water management. Water management is 
also a key element of the Dutch contribution to the Global Commission on 
Adaptation, of which the Netherlands is initiator, a convening country and a 
direct funder.  
 
The Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment is an 
independent advisory body composed of experts. In 2017, it won an award for 
the quality of its services. It provides advisory services and capacity 
development to international governments on the quality of environmental 
assessments, with the aim of contributing to sound decision-making. However, 
on the domestic front, its data on nitrogen deposits in protected natural areas 
were called into question by major political parties when court cases on the 
issue forced the government to take urgent measures in the agricultural and 
construction sectors.  
 
Military aspects have been added to the International Safety Budget, which 
previously referenced only diplomatic and civic activities. Defense spending in 
response to the revival of NATO in Europe and threats in the Middle East will 
increase from €220 million to €345 million between 2016 and 2020. As 
mentioned under the previous indicator (“Environmental Policy”) the Paris 
Climate Accords have triggered major new Dutch policy initiatives in the area 
of global environmental protection. 
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 With a score of 80 out of 100 points the Netherlands ranked 8 out of 158 
countries in the March 2018 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, after 
Denmark (score 86), Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Germany and Costa 
Rica. Its highest scores are in the areas of electoral laws and electoral 
procedures; somewhat lower scores are in the areas of voter registration and 
party and candidacy registration.  
 
The country’s electoral law and articles 53 through 56 of the constitution detail 
the basic procedures for free elections at the European, national, provincial 
and municipal levels. The independence of the Election Council (Kiesraad) 
responsible for supervising elections is stipulated by law.  
 
All Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands are equally entitled to run for 
election, although some restrictions apply in cases where the candidate suffers 
from a mental disorder, a court order has deprived the individual of eligibility 
for election, or a candidate’s party name is believed to endanger public order. 
Anyone possessing citizenship – even minors – can start a political party with 
minimal legal but considerable financial constraints. Some argue that party-
membership and party-caucus rules strongly diminish formal equality with 
regard to electoral-system accessibility. Political parties with elected members 
receive state money (subsidies and other benefits), while qualifying as a new 
party necessitates payment of a considerable entry fee. 
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 The Media Law (Article 39g) requires that political parties with one or more 
seats in either chamber of the States General be allotted time on the national 
broadcasting stations (radio, television) during the parliamentary term, 
provided that they participate in nationwide elections. The Commission for the 
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Media ensures that political parties are given equal media access free from 
government influence or interference (Article 11.3). The commission is also 
responsible for allotting national broadcasting time to political parties 
participating in European elections. Broadcasting time is denied only to parties 
that have been fined for breaches of Dutch anti-discrimination legislation. The 
public prosecutor is bringing discrimination charges against Geert Wilders, the 
leading member of parliament representing the Party for Freedom. However, 
individual media outlets decide themselves how much attention to pay to 
political parties and candidates. Since 2004, state subsidies for participating in 
elections have been granted only to parties already represented in the States 
General. Whether this practice constitutes a form of unequal treatment for 
newcomers is currently a matter of discussion. 
However, media access these days also means access to social media (Twitter, 
blogs, YouTube), especially when competing for younger voters (18 – 35 age 
group). Dutch political parties have together spent more than €200,000 on F  
acebook advertisements in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 
2019. Public debate on topics of this nature is only beginning, inspired by 
issues such as the general financing of political parties, access to social media 
by new political parties, movements with strong but undisclosed financial 
support, and foreign interference in national elections. 
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 Contrary to other civil rights, the right to vote in national, provincial or water 
board elections is restricted to citizens with Dutch nationality of 18 years and 
older (as of election day). For local elections, voting rights apply to all 
registered as legal residents for at least five years and to all EU nationals 
residing in the Netherlands. Convicts have the right to vote by authorization 
only; as part of their conviction, some may be denied voting rights for two to 
five years over and above their prison terms. Since the elections in 2010, each 
voter is obliged to show a legally approved ID in addition to a voting card. 
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 The Dutch government spends less money than its counterparts in most other 
European countries on financing political parties, at €1 per voter (compared to 
€9.70 for Iceland). Based on GRECO estimates, Dutch political parties are 
also less reliant on government money (receiving between 35% and 50% of 
their funding from this source)  than are most other European political parties, 
with the exception of those in Germany. 
 
Until about a decade ago, political-party finances were not a contested issue in 
Dutch politics. Party funds come largely through membership contributions 
(40% – 50%), a “party tax” applied to elected members’ salaries, event 
revenues and donations, and government subsidies. However, relatively new 
like the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and the Party for Freedom 
(Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), as well as the very successful Forum for 
Democracy, have received substantial gifts from businesses and/or foreign 
sources, while the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) has made its 
parliamentarians completely financially dependent on the party leadership by 
demanding that their salaries be donated in full to the party. 
 
As government transparency became a political issue, these glaring opacities 
in the Dutch “non-system” of party financing were flagged by the Council of 
Europe and the Group of Countries against Corruption (GRECO) – resulting in 
increasing pressures to change the law. Political expediency caused many 
delays, but the Rutte I Council of Ministers introduced a bill on the financing 
of political parties in 2011, which was signed into law in 2013. GRECO has 
also addressed the procedure for monitoring party finances (particularly when 
the rules are improved), noting that this task should rest not with a minister or 
political figure, but with an independent body.  
 
The 2013 law eradicates many – but not all – of the earlier loopholes. Political 
parties are obliged to register gifts starting at €1,000, and at €4,500 they are 
obliged to publish the name and address of the donor. This rule has been 
opposed by the PVV as an infringement of the right to anonymously support a 
political party. Direct provision of services and facilities to political parties is 
also regulated. Non-compliance will be better monitored. The scope of the law 
does not yet extend to provincial or local political parties. The law’s possible 
discrimination against newcomer political parties remains an unresolved issue. 
 
In 2018, an ad hoc advisory commission evaluated the 2013 law. It argued that 
anonymous donations (especially from foreign donors) should be prohibited, 
and that the threshold and conditions for non-disclosure should be changed in 
favor of greater transparency. It additionally recommended that state 
subsidization should in the future be based on the number of party members 
rather than the number of parliamentary seats, with the aim of strengthening 
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political parties’ societal roots.    Furthermore, it said that provincial and local 
political parties should be brought within the scope of the law. The 
government only partially followed the commission’s advice. Foreign 
donations were limited to within-EU donations, but the idea of privileging 
membership numbers more than the number of seats held was put on hold. 
Recently, an alleged corruption case involving aldermen in the municipal 
government of The Hague has placed the issue back on the political agenda, 
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 Binding popular initiatives and referendums are unlawful both nationally and 
subnationally, as they are considered to be incompatible with the 
representative system. At the municipal level, many experimental referendum 
ordinances have been approved since the 1990s, but the national government 
has prohibited several ordinances that gave citizens too much binding 
influence on either the political agenda or the outcome of political decision-
making. In 2016, a large number of municipal government mayors, aldermen, 
councilors, scientists and businessmen initiated “Code Orange” for 
“civocracy,” (“citizen power”) which aims to involve citizens more in local 
governance through “citizen pacts” (“burgerakkoord”). The citizen pacts are 
intended to replace and/or complement the traditional “coalition pacts” 
between local political parties, which normally are the basis for policymaking. 
After the 2018 elections experiments in citizen pacts are being conducted. 
Though all the experiments are struggling with the practical aspects of 
integrating citizen pacts into the legal framework and normal division of labor 
of local forms of representative democracy.  
 
At national level, the issue has been on the political agenda since the 1980s. 
Under pressure from new populist political parties, the Dutch government 
organized a consultative referendum on the new European Constitution in 
2005, using an ad hoc temporary law. With turnout of 63.3% of the eligible 
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electorate, this constitution was rejected by a clear majority of 61.5%, sending 
shockwaves through all EU member states and institutions. In September 
2014, a bill for an advisory referendum on laws and treaties passed the Senate, 
and was implemented on 1 July 2015. This law allows for non-binding 
referendums on petitions that gain 10,000 signatories within a four-week 
period. Subsequently, another 300,000 citizens are needed to sign up in 
support of the initial request within a six weeks period.  
 
Geen Peil, an ad hoc anti-EU organization, successfully mobilized enough 
votes for an advisory referendum on the provisional EU association treaty with 
Ukraine, which was signed by the Dutch government. With a mere 32.3% 
voter turnout, the no-vote (61%) was valid nevertheless, and the government 
was obliged to renegotiate the deal at EU level. In March 2018, in another 
consultative referendum, Dutch voters rejected a proposed Law on the 
Intelligence and Security Services (Wet op de Inlichtingen en 
Veiligheidsdiensten) by a narrow margin (49.44% against, 46.53% for and 4% 
undecided). This result forced the government to reconsider some parts of the 
law. The unpleasant referendum campaigns and their contested outcomes 
prompted the Rutte III government to abolish the consultative referendum as 
one of its first regulatory decisions. Nevertheless, the Remkes Commission for 
State-Legitimacy Reforms (Staatkundige Hervorming) states that Dutch 
democracy suffers from a “representation deficit” defined by demography, 
educational attainment, wealth and professional background. Among many 
other reform proposals, the Remkes Commission has seriously considered 
putting the issue of a binding referendum back the political agenda. To date, 
only one political party (D66) has adopted this advice, using the issue as an 
element of the party’s 2020 election campaign. 
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Access to Information 
Media Freedom 
Score: 7 
 The freedoms of the press/media and of expression are formally guaranteed by 
the constitution (Article 7). The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom 
Index 2018 ranked the Netherlands at fourth place out of 180 countries, one 
rank down from the previous year, and below Norway, Finland and Sweden. 
The somewhat lower ranking results from the way that right-wing populist 
parties treat journalists (e.g., questioning the legitimacy of the traditional 
media and restricting targeted journalists’ access to political meetings), as well 
as from internet-based smear campaigns against reporters, particularly women 
who are not native-born Dutch. As a consequence, the report argues, Dutch 
journalists practice self-censorship on sensitive issues such as immigration, 
race, Islam and the ostensible national character. However, by international 
standards, journalists in the Netherlands are free from governmental 
interference. For example, their right to protect their sources even when called 
upon as witnesses in criminal cases is usually formally upheld.  
 
Public-broadcast programming is produced by a variety of civil organizations, 
some reflecting political and/or religious denominations, others representing 
interest groups. These independent organizations get allocated TV and radio 
time that is relative to their membership numbers. However, broadcasting 
corporations are required to comply with government regulations laid down in 
the new Media Law. This new law abolished the monopoly of the incumbent 
public-broadcasting corporations and aims to boost competition by giving 
access to program providers from outside the official broadcasting 
corporations. A directing (not just coordinating) National Public Broadcasting 
Organization (NPO) was established, with a two-member government-
nominated supervisory board, which tests and allocates broadcasting time. At 
the time of writing, this board was not yet functioning due to as yet unresolved 
internal disagreements. The new law states that public broadcasting should 
concern information, culture and education, while pure entertainment should 
be left to private broadcasters. In practice this has led to controversy around 
television celebrities’ salaries in public broadcasting, and blurred boundaries 
between “information” and “infotainment.” The bill has been criticized for 
failing to take broadcasters’ financial needs into account, and critics have 
argued that younger people and non-Dutch population groups will no longer 
be served by the public broadcasting system. Currently, broadcasting is both 
privately funded through advertisements and publicly funded. Regional 
broadcasters have been subject to budget cuts that have left them in fragile 
health, and will need to collaborate to survive. Politically, the existence of a 
public broadcasting system is becoming an increasingly contested issue. At 
least four different scenarios for the future of the public broadcasting system 
are under discussion. 
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 The Dutch media landscape is very pluralistic but nonetheless subject to a 
gradual narrowing of media ownership, internationalization and rapid 
commercialization. On the other hand, availability of (foreign and national) 
web-based TV and radio has increased tremendously. The Dutch media 
landscape is still characterized by one of the world’s highest newspaper-
readership rates. Innovations in newspaper media include tabloids, Sunday 
editions, and new-media editions (online, mobile phone, etc.). On a regional 
level, the one-paper-city model is now dominant; there are even several cities 
lacking local papers altogether.  
 
The degree of ownership concentration in the print media is high. Three 
publishers control 90% of the paid newspapers circulated, and foreign 
ownership of print media outlets is growing. As the circulation of traditional 
magazines decreases, publishers are launching new titles to attract readers. 
There are currently at least 8,000 different magazine titles available for Dutch 
readers. Print outlets – both newspapers and magazines – carry a high share of 
advertising, but this is declining. There are several public and private 
television and radio stations at the national, regional and local levels. The three 
public channels continue to lose viewers. The Netherlands also shows one of 
Europe’s highest rates of cable TV penetration (about 95%). However, online 
access to news and entertainment has increased due to the prevalence of 
smartphones, widespread availability of Wi-Fi, and paid news and 
entertainment sources. Though the issue of ownership concentration also 
affects the social media and internet search engines. Internet usage rates in the 
Netherlands are high and many people are connected through broadband 
(almost 50% of Dutch households). Ten million Dutch residents use the 
internet on a regular basis, amounting to almost 95.5% of the population aged 
over six years old. For both print and digital media, users usually trust news 
reports and do not worry excessively about the issue of fake news, although a 
clear majority believe that technology and media companies ought to provide 
better information about and more opportunities for identifying fake news. The 
government also has a responsibility according to many internet users. 
 
In the European Union’s Media Pluralism Monitor 2017, the Netherlands was 
characterized low risk in the domains of basic protection, political 
independence and social inclusiveness. However, the country was 
characterized medium risk in market plurality and high risk for concentration 
of cross-media ownership, as there are no legal restrictions at all and 
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transparency of ownership is low. Consequently, a typical person’s media 
sources are likely to be controlled by the same, one owner. This requires better 
regulation of media mergers. 
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 The Government Information (Public Access) Act (WOB) 1991 governs both 
active and passive public access to information. Under the WOB, any person 
can demand information related to an “administrative matter” if it is contained 
in “documents” held by public authorities or companies carrying out work for 
a public authority. Information must be withheld, however, if it would 
endanger the unity of the Crown, damage the security of the state, or 
particularly if it relates to information on companies and manufacturing 
processes that were provided in confidence. Information can also be withheld 
“if its importance does not outweigh” the imperatives of international relations 
and the economic or financial interest of the state.  
 
Between 2010 and 2012, access to government information became a 
politically contested issue. In practice, the law was used more and more to 
justify withholding of information to citizens and journalists in the name of 
“state interest,” which usually referred the desire to retain the confidentiality 
of intra-government consultation. On the other hand, local governments 
accused citizens of improper use of the WOB at the expense of public monies 
and time. A new Open Government Act (Wet open overheid) is being 
considered by parliament, which is awaiting the results of experiments in this 
area within several Dutch municipalities. In 2018, the High Council of State 
clarified its position on when the need to protect personal privacy (e.g., names 
of civil servants) or personal policy views expressed during governmental 
deliberations could be considered appropriate justifications for withholding 
information. This ruling pertained to politically salient, post-election cabinet-
formation negotiations. Meanwhile, the old law has additionally been 
broadened to include messages transmitted via SMS and WhatsApp. 
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Civil Rights and Political Liberties 
Civil Rights 
Score: 6 
 The Netherlands guarantees and protects individual liberties, and all state 
institutions respect and – most of the time – effectively protect civil rights. The 
Netherlands publicly exposes abuses and reports them to the UN Human 
Rights Council or the European Union. It cooperates with the monitoring 
organizations of all international laws and treaties concerning civil liberties 
signed by the Dutch government.  
 
However, there are developments worthy of concern. The right to privacy of 
every citizen tops the list of preoccupations. Dutch citizens are more at risk 
than ever of having their personal data abused or improperly used. In addition, 
current policies regarding rightful government infringement of civil rights are 
shifting from legally well-delineated areas like anti-crime and terrorism 
measures toward less clearly defined areas involving the prevention of risky 
behavior (e.g., in personal health, education and childcare) and travel 
behavior. Increased monitoring and digital surveillance technologies 
disproportionally target those most dependent on state support, creating 
inequalities in policing and fraud control. Many of the monitoring and 
surveillance technologies – which often link various databases – are also 
poorly monitored legally. Most recently, UN Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights Philip Alston criticized the Dutch government (and parliament) for its 
use of an algorithmic system (Systeem Risico Indicatie) to detect social-
benefits fraud. The system linked data from across all government databases to 
generate an individual fraud-risk profile. A system of this design violated 
everybody’s privacy rights, but particularly those of poor people and 
individuals with a migrant background, Alston said. 
 
Human Rights Watch has criticized recent Dutch legislation restricting the 
number of locations for hosting asylum-seekers, as well as the long wait times 
for asylum decisions and family-reunion procedures, Recently, the government 
has expanded its list of safe third countries for asylum-seekers (including, 
surprisingly, Afghanistan) and the Council of State was criticized for failing to 
uphold the rights of asylum-seekers in appeals to government decisions. On 
the other hand, the Dutch government withdrew a bill that would have 
criminalized illegal residence, allowing authorities to put those lacking 
residence permits in jail. There were concerns about racial profiling by police 
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officers and white Dutch citizens interfering in protests against the traditional 
“Black Pete” (“Zwarte Piet”) figure in traditional St. Nicholas festivities. 
However, Frisian pro-Black Pete activists – who stopped anti-racist protesters 
by blocking a highway – were condemned for disturbing the public order, with 
this verdict upheld in a higher appeals court. 
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 All the usual political liberties (of assembly, association, movement, religion, 
speech, press, thought, unreasonable searches/seizures and suffrage) are 
guaranteed by the constitution. The Netherlands is a signatory to all pertinent 
major international treaties (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on 
Human Rights). All relevant ranking institutions, such as The Economist’s 
Intelligence Unit Democracy Index and the Freedom House ranking of 
political liberties, consistently list the Netherlands as one of the leading free 
countries in the world.  
 
However, the protection of privacy rights is in practice increasingly subject to 
political attention and public debate. The Expert Body on the Protection of 
Privacy Data (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens) has identified a 
growing number of deliberate or unintended infringements of the 
constitutional right to privacy. Since January 2016, its powers have been 
broadened and it can now impose fines. There is also an obligation for large 
data-processing private and public companies to immediately report any data 
leaks. Nevertheless, there is a widespread perception that the big data 
revolution poses a considerable threat to privacy rights and the government’s 
response has been too weak. 
 
The adoption and enactment (as of 1 May 2018) of the Intelligence and 
Security Services Act provoked widespread fear of the dragnet surveillance of 
private citizen communications. It resulted in a successful “no” campaign in 
the consultative referendum on this law, which forced the government to 
adjustment the law to accommodate public objections. Though a judge has 
ruled that pending the government’s reconsideration and adjustment of the 
law, the law could remain in force. 
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Regarding the Black Pete issue, a number of municipalities have restricted the 
right to free assembly and the right to hold demonstrations for those calling for 
an end to the tradition, citing security concerns. The government passed a law 
banning the burqa and niqab in public places (including schools, hospitals and 
government buildings, and on public transportation); however, it also publicly 
announced that enforcement of this law was “not a priority.” 
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 The Netherlands is party to all the important international anti-discrimination 
agreements. A non-discrimination clause addressing religion, worldviews, 
political convictions, race, sex and “any other grounds for discrimination” is 
contained in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. An individual can invoke 
Article 1 in relation to acts carried out by the government, private institutions 
or another individual. The constitutional framework has been specified by 
several acts that also refer to the EC Directives on equal treatment. In total, 
there is a high degree of protection, even though the definition of indirect 
discrimination provided by the European Commission has not been adopted by 
the Dutch legislature, and many regulations avoid the term “discrimination” in 
favor of “distinction” (with fewer negative connotations in a religiously and 
culturally diverse society like the Netherlands). Nevertheless, while it is 
difficult to document racism as manifest in decisions or actions taken (the 
number of complaints is not public), it cannot be denied that racism is 
increasingly manifest in verbal statements.      A recent expert report criticized 
Dutch anti-discrimination sanctions as “ineffective,” and as neither 
“dissuasive” nor “proportionate.” Previous signals that discrimination is 
practiced by Dutch police have recently been confirmed; for instance, a chief 
of police who identified and sought to address discrimination in her own 
precinct was recently fired. 
 
In other respects, Dutch legislation has gone beyond what is required by EU 
directives. In terms of policy, the Dutch government does not pursue 
affirmative action to tackle inequality and facilitate non-discrimination. 
Generally, the government relies on “soft law” measures as a preferred policy 
instrument to curb discrimination. There are more and more doubts about state 
policies’ effectiveness. Depending on significant (international) events (e.g., 
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Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, terrorist attacks and public debates about Black 
Pete) discriminatory actions, internet-based threats and insults targeting Jews, 
Muslims and Afro-Dutch citizens increase. Especially worrisome is the broad-
based and well above the European average negative climate of opinion and 
stereotyping of Muslims. A direct political consequence was the establishment 
in 2015 of a political party that appeals to second- and third-generation 
migrants, DENK (meaning “think!” in Dutch, but “equal” in Turkish). DENK 
has secured three seats in the 150-seat Dutch parliament and a total of 23 seats 
in 13 different municipal councils. Growing awareness of employer’s 
discriminating against young people with migrant backgrounds in job 
application processes forced new national and local-government initiatives. 
According to recent survey research, the Dutch population is seriously worried 
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Rule of Law 
Legal Certainty 
Score: 6 
 Dutch governments and administrative authorities have to a great extent 
internalized legality and legal certainty on all levels in their decisions and 
actions in civil, penal and administrative law. In the World Justice Project 
Rule of Law Index 2019,   the Netherlands was again ranked fifth out of 126 
countries. However, the no more than slight decline in its score curiously 
disregards previous warnings from legal experts that the situation is rapidly 
deteriorating, and that it was indeed nearing crisis levels in 2019.  
 
In a “stress test” (2015) examining the state’s performance on rule-of-law 
issues, former ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer argued after a comprehensive 
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review that particularly in legislation, but also within the administrative and 
judicial systems, safeguards for compliance with rule-of-law requirements are 
no longer sufficiently in place. In legislative politics, appeal to a national 
Constitutional Court is impossible and contested among experts. The trend is 
to bypass new legislative measures’ rule-of-law implications with an appeal to 
the “primacy of politics” or simply “democracy,” and instead await possible 
appeals to European and other international legal bodies during policy 
implementation.  
 
The country’s major political party, the conservative-liberal People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy (VVD), has proposed to abolish the upper house of 
the States General, and with it the legal assessment of Dutch laws on the basis 
of the legal obligations assumed under international treaties. Within the state 
administration, the departmental bureaucracy too often prioritizes managerial 
feasibility over political and legal requirements. For example, fiscal and social 
security agencies have become exceptionally punitive toward ordinary 
citizens, not just in cases of suspected fraud, but also in cases of forgetfulness 
or error. Moreover, there has been a considerable quantity of unambiguous 
failures. For example, there is evidence that the accumulation of so-called 
administrative sanctions has driven people into poverty, and additional 
evidence that tax authorities have illegally stopped tax benefits for childcare to 
eligible families. The process of seeking compensation for physical or 
psychological harm is called a “tombola” (a kind of lottery-based gambling 
game), with widely divergent outcomes in terms of whether and when victims 
are granted funds. Police and the judicial system are losing the war on drugs. 
 
The Council of Jurisprudence was established in 2002 as an independent 
boundary advisory   commission between the Ministry of Justice, parliament 
and the supposedly politically independent judicial branch. As a boundary-
spanning mechanism, the council proved to be a clear failure in 2017 and 
2018. Its chair declared that the judiciary was outdated for a modern, rapidly 
changing society. Citizens and businesses alike stated that judicial procedures 
were too expensive, too complex, too time-consuming and too uncertain in 
their outcome. Meanwhile, the digitalization of routine judicial procedures has 
been a failure, and has cost the government dearly. Political debates on the 
issue of judicial reform have focused on the budget for the judiciary (€900 
million), and on how to structurally reduce the deficit, for example, by 
“outsourcing” judicial tasks to private mediation. Judges have demanded the 
right to determine their own budget; this has not happened, but the judicial-
affairs budget was increased in 2018. In an exceptional move, lawyers, judges 
and prosecutors wrote a joint letter   to the government expressing their “fear 
for the future of the judiciary branch.” 
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 Judicial review for civil and criminal law in the Netherlands involves a closed 
system of appeals with the Supreme Court as the final authority. Unlike the 
U.S. and German Supreme Court, the Dutch Supreme Court is barred from 
judging parliamentary laws in terms of their conformity with the constitution. 
A further constraint is that the Supreme Court must practice cassation justice – 
should it find the conduct of a case (as carried out by the defense and/or 
prosecution, but not the judge him/herself) wanting, it can only order the lower 
court to conduct a retrial.  
 
In 2018, the intensity of judicial review of executive actions reached an all-
time high. This attracted international attention when a Dutch appeals court 
upheld a landmark climate-change ruling, instructing the Rutte government to 
raise its greenhouse-gas reduction goal of 17% to at least 25%. However, the 
judiciary itself also came under increasing scrutiny, both with regard to its 
internal functioning and the degree to which it was truly independent of 
politics.  
 
Several glaring miscarriages of justice have raised public doubts as to the 
quality of justice in the Netherlands. This has led to renewed opportunities to 
reopen previously tried cases in which questionable convictions have been 
delivered. In 2017, a deputy minister of legal affairs openly admitted that he 
reduced the provision of state-supported legal assistance to ordinary citizens in 
order to achieve more punitive court sentences. And in the drugs- and crime-
ridden province of Brabant, police, mayors and fiscal authorities sometimes 
“harass” suspects rather than initiating legal procedures, which they perceive 
as a time-consuming nuisance. Judges have voiced concerns as to the quality 
of the work performed by lawyers, and thus directly about professional 
practices and indirectly about the legal-education system. The reputation of the 
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public prosecution service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM) too has come under 
public scrutiny. It has been criticized for striking mega-deals (such as fines) 
with corporations and banks, which are presumably deemed more efficient 
than conducting full-fledged trials of legally sanctionable financial or 
managerial misconduct. Evidence has shown that OM staffers lacking the 
proper professional accreditation have rendered decisions on thousands of 
criminal cases with insufficient evidence. The prosecution service’s degree of 
independence from the government has also come under public and 
journalistic scrutiny, and integrity problems within the organization itself have 
almost paralyzed its functioning. The legal trial for hate speech by Dutch 
parliamentarian Geert Wilders may fail due to alleged political interference in 
the judicial procedure.  
 
Whereas the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary and highly independent of 
politics, administrative appeals and review are allocated to three high councils 
of state (Hoge Colleges van Staat), which are subsumed under the executive, 
and thus not fully independent of politics: the Council of State (serves as an 
advisor to the government on all legislative affairs and is the highest court of 
appeal in matters of administrative law); the General Audit Chamber (reviews 
legality of government spending and its policy effectiveness and efficiency); 
and the ombudsman for research into the conduct of administration regarding 
individual citizens in particular. Members are nominated by the Council of 
Ministers and appointed for life (excepting the ombudsman, who serves only 
six years) by the States General. Appointments are never politically 
contentious. In international comparison, the Council of State holds a rather 
unique position. It advises government in its legislative capacity, and it also 
acts as an administrative judge of last appeal involving the same laws. This 
situation is only partly remedied by a division of labor between an advisory 
chamber and a judiciary chamber. Some observers defend this structure, 
arguing that only an entity with detailed and intimate knowledge of the 
practical difficulties associated with policy implementation and legal 
enforcement can offer sound advice to the government in this area. 
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 Justices, both in civil/criminal and in administrative courts, are appointed by 
different, though primarily legal and political, bodies in formally cooperative 
selection processes without special majority requirements. In the case of 
criminal/civil courts, judges are de facto appointed through peer co-optation. 
According to the Council for Jurisprudence (Raad voor de Rechtspraak), 
“…[I]n the Netherlands, political appointments don’t exist. Selection of judges 
is a matter for judges themselves, of the courts and the Supreme Court, on the 
basis of expertise alone. You cannot even raise the issue of political or 
confessional convictions.” This is also true of the lower administrative courts. 
Only Geert Wilders, parliamentarian for the right-wing populist Party for 
Freedom, has proposed (in 2011) to substitute a five-year term for judges’ 
current lifetime appointment. 
 
The Netherlands’ highest court, the Council of State, is subject to relatively 
strong political influence, mainly expressed through the appointment of former 
politicians, and through a considerable number of double appointments. Only 
state counselors working in the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (as 
opposed to the Legislative Advisory Division) are required to hold an 
academic degree in law. Appointments to the Supreme Court are for life 
(judges generally retire at 70). Appointments are generally determined by 
seniority and (partly) peer reputation. Formally, however, the Second Chamber 
(House of Representatives) of the States General selects the candidate from a 
shortlist presented by the Supreme Court. In selecting a candidate, the States 
General is said never to deviate from the top candidate. 
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 The Netherlands is considered a relatively corruption-free country. This may 
well explain why its anti-corruption policy is relatively underdeveloped. The 
Dutch prefer to talk about “committing fraud” rather than “corrupt practices,” 
and about improving “integrity” and “transparency” rather than talking of 
fighting or preventing corruption, which appears to be a taboo issue. 
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Research on corruption is mostly focused on the public sector and much more 
on petty corruption by civil servants than on arguably increasing mega-
corruption by mayors, aldermen, top-level provincial administrators, elected 
representatives or ministers. Almost all public sector organizations now have 
an integrity code of conduct. However, the soft law approach to integrity 
means that “hard” rules and sanctions against fraud, corruption and 
inappropriate use of administrative power are underdeveloped. In at least three 
(out of 17) areas, the Netherlands does not meet the standards for effective 
integrity policy as identified by Transparency International, with all three 
areas failing to prevent and appropriately prosecute corruption. Experts 
attribute this to a highly fragmented and operationally inconsistent network of 
public and semi-public organizations tasked with fighting corruption and 
fraud.  
 
There have been more and more frequent prosecutions in major corruption 
scandals in the public sector involving top-executives – particularly in 
(government-commissioned) construction of infrastructure and housing, but 
also in education, healthcare and transport. Transparency problems in the 
public sector also involve lower ranks, job nominations and salaries for top-
level administrators. Increasingly, police and customs officers have been 
prosecuted for assisting criminal organizations in illegal-drug production and 
transportation. One high-level police officer in a lecture for the Police 
Academy used the term “Netherlands Narcostate” to characterize the dire state 
of affairs.  
 
In July 2016, a new law for the protection of whistleblowers entered into 
force. Experts consider the law to be largely symbolic, with real legal 
protection remaining minimal despite high administrative costs. A “house for 
whistleblowers,” intended to protect whistleblowers and facilitate their 
activities, proved to be a failure. The increasing amount of public sector 
corruption cases i  ndicates either confusion or a political unwillingness to 
tackle the issue effectively. 
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 The Dutch government has four strategic-planning units: the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regereingsbeleid, WRR), the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
(Centraal Plan Bureau, CPB), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research 
(Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) and the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Bureau (Planbureau voor de Leefbaarheid, PBL). All of these are 
formally part of a ministry, but their statutes guarantee them independent 
watchdog and advisory functions. 
 
Long-term steering capacity has traditionally been strong in the areas of water 
management and the management of care – that is, in ensuring the maximum 
opportunity for good care for every eligible citizen, for an acceptable cost. In 
2016, the Dutch Association for Public Administration called for the 
mobilization of more strategic knowledge and steering capacity in national 
governance. In 2019, evidence has accumulated that this call has to some 
extent been heeded. The most salient shift in long-tern governmental strategy 
has been to abandon the neoliberal policy model. At the end of 2018, a tax 
reduction for big corporations was still deemed to be a top priority, with the 
aim of creating a better investment environment. In 2019, however, concern 
definitely tilted toward addressing the stagnation in middle-class incomes 
despite five years of economic growth, and on ensuring that the burdens and 
costs imposed by the climate agreement would be shared fairly between 
corporations and consumers. After many years of discussion, a new pension 
agreement was reached because the government dropped its demands for a 
gradual but permanent increase in the age of pension eligibility. All this shows 
that the strategic shift has been more about consolidating and administrating 
care and social benefits than about fostering optimism and progress, as would 
be represented by investments in education or a substantial greening of the 
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economy. Huge demonstrations by farmers and construction companies 
against a new nitrogen-emission rule (using tractors and heavy machinery to 
paralyze traffic) forced the government to change course; equally large 
demonstrations by teachers and students prompted only government 
resistance.  
 
Planning units have released a flurry of new policy proposals, although though 
their data and policy recommendations, in the age of science skepticism, have 
been attacked by the political parties that normally rely on them for political 
debate and deliberation. These proposals have addressed the areas of pensions, 
population growth, most aspects of climate change (the Urgenda verdict, the 
new nitrogen-emissions rule, biodiversity in the Dutch natural environment), 
the future of Dutch agriculture, traffic infrastructure and mobility, the future of 
care as a social issue, the role of money and financial regulation, and labor-
market regulatory reforms, to cite just a few. 
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 The government frequently employs ad hoc commissions of scientific experts 
on technical topics like water management, harbor and airport expansion, gas 
drilling on Wadden Sea islands and pollution studies. The function of 
scientific advisory services in departments has been strengthened through the 
establishment of “knowledge chambers” and, following U.S. and UK practice, 
the appointment of chief scientific officers or chief scientists as advisory 
experts. Depending on the nature of the policy issues, these experts may 
flexibly mobilize the required scientific bodies and scientists instead of relying 
on fixed advisory councils with fixed memberships. This also allows room for 
political flexibility – that is, by hiring commercial, private consultancies to 
provide politically desirable research and advice. 
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Although the use of scientific expertise is quite high, its actual influence on 
policymaking cannot be estimated as scholarly advice is intended to be 
instrumental and therefore is not yet welcome in the early phases of 
policymaking. It is certainly not transparent to the wider public. Since 2011, 
advice has regressed from relatively “strategic and long-term” to “technical, 
instrumental and mid-/short-term.” 
 
As might be expected in times of political polarization and science skepticism, 
even members of parliament have expressed doubts as to the integrity of the 
knowledge institutes and the validity of their information. The research unit of 
the Ministry of Justice and Safety (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeks – en 
Documentatie Centrum, WODC) has been subject to political meddling, and 
during the debates and deliberations on the climate agreement, the 
Environmental Planning Agency’s measurement and modeling practices came 
under regular scrutiny. 
 
Nevertheless, the cabinet still appears to rely heavily on its knowledge 
institutes and departmental knowledge centers for its long-term strategies and 
decision-making. The scrutiny by political parties, members of parliament, 
civil society associations and journalists has generally been beneficial with 
regard to the transparency of information collection and the policy support 
provided by the government’s knowledge institutes. 
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 The Dutch prime minister is formally in charge of coordinating government 
policy as a whole, and has a concomitant range of powers, which include 
deciding on the composition of the Council of Ministers’ agenda and 
formulating its conclusions and decisions; chairing Council of Ministers 
meetings, committees (onderraad) and (in most cases) ministerial committees; 
adjudicating interdepartmental conflicts; serving as the primary press 
spokesperson and first speaker in the States General; and speaking in 
international forums and arenas (e.g., European Union and the United Nations) 
on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the Dutch government as a whole. 
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The prime minister’s own Ministry of General Affairs office has some 14 
advising councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) at its disposal. The 
advising councilors are top-level civil servants, not political appointees. In 
addition, the prime minister has a special relationship with the Scientific 
Council of Government Policy. Sometimes, deputy directors of the planning 
agencies play the role of secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” To 
conclude, the Prime Minister’s Office and the prime minister himself have a 
rather limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals 
unless they openly clash with the government platform (regeer-akkoord). Of 
course, personal skills and experience make a difference, and Prime Minister 
Rutte has a reputation for excellent informal leadership and conflict 
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 Generally, line-ministry legislative or white-paper initiatives are rooted in the 
government policy accord, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council of 
Ministers decisions to allocate drafting to one or two particular ministries. In 
the case of complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable 
jockeying for position among the various line ministries. The prime minister is 
always involved in the kick-off of major new policy initiatives and sometimes 
in the wording of the assignment/terms of reference itself. After that, however, 
it may take between six months and four years before the issue reaches the 
decision-making stage in ministerial and Council of Ministers committees, and 
again comes under the formal review of the prime minister. Meanwhile, the 
prime minister is obliged to rely on informal coordination with his fellow 
ministers. It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of 
informal coordination, information-sharing procedures and other such 
practices. High-level civil servants close to the prime minister have 
SGI 2020 | 61  Netherlands Report 
 
complained about the increasing use of spin doctors and political assistants in 
such processes. But the prime minister has a good reputation with regard to 
formal leadership and conflict management. 
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 Council of Ministers committees (onderraad) involve a separate meeting 
chaired by the prime minister for the ministers involved. Each committee has a 
coordinating minister responsible for relevant input and documents. 
Discussion and negotiations focus on issues not resolved through prior 
administrative coordination and consultation. If the committee fails to reach a 
decision, the matter is pushed up to the Council of Ministers.  
 
Since the Balkenende IV Council of Ministers there have been six standing 
Council of Ministers committees: international and European affairs; 
economics, knowledge and innovation; social coherence; safety and legal 
order; and administration, government and public services. Given the elaborate 
process of consultations and negotiations, few issues are likely to have escaped 
attention and discussion before reaching the Council of Ministers.  
 
However, since the Rutte I and II cabinets have consisted of two or more 
political parties of contrary ideological stripes (the conservative-liberal VVD 
and the PvdA or Labor Party, in the case of Rutte II), political pragmatism and 
opportunism has tended to transform “review and coordination” to simple 
logrolling, or in Dutch political jargon: “positive exchange,” meaning that 
each party agrees tacitly or explicitly not to veto the other’s bills. This 
tendency has negative consequences for the quality of policymaking, as 
minority views effectively win parliamentary majorities if they are feasible 
from a budgetary perspective without first undergoing rigorous policy and 
legal analyses. In the second half of the Rutte II cabinet, the government had 
to garner political support for its policy initiatives through elaborate 
negotiations with political parties in the Senate/First Chamber who were not 
formally part of the governing coalition. Introducing a wider range of 
perspectives and decision criteria may have increased the quality of 
policymaking and the democratic nature of the process, given that not only 




 Since the 2006 elections, politicians have demanded a reduction in the number 
of civil servants. This has resulted in a loss of substantive expertise, with civil 
servants essentially becoming process managers. Moreover, it has undermined 
the traditional relations of loyalty and trust between (deputy) ministers and 
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top-level officers. The former have broken the monopoly formerly held by 
senior staff on the provision advice and information by turning increasingly to 
outside sources such as consultants. Top-level officers have responded with 
risk-averse and defensive behavior exemplified by professionally driven 
organizational communication and process management. They have embraced 
some Dutch variation of New Public Management thinking and practices. The 
upshot is that ministerial compartmentalization in the preparation of Council 
of Ministers meetings has increased. Especially in the Ministry of Justice and 
Safety, the quality of bureaucratic policy and legislation preparation has 
become a reason for serious concern. 
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 Very little is actually known about informal coordination at the (sub-)Council 
of Ministers level regarding policymaking and decision-making. The best-
known informal procedure used to be the “Torentjesoverleg,” in which the 
prime minister and a core members of the Council of Ministers consulted with 
the leaders of the political parties supporting the coalition in the Prime 
Minister’s Office (“Het Torentje”). Although sometimes considered 
objectionable – as it appears to contradict the ideal of dualism between the 
executive and the legislative – coalition governments cannot survive without 
this kind of high-level political coordination between the government and the 
States General. Given the weak parliamentary support held by the Rutte I and 
II councils of ministers (October 2010 – February 2017), such informal 
coordination is no longer limited to political parties providing support to the 
governing coalition. 
 
Under the present conditions, in which civil servants are subject to increasing 
parliamentary and media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and loyalty 
between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are growing, 
informal coordination and the personal chemistry among civil servants are 
what keeps things running. Regarding interministerial coordination, informal 
contacts between the senior staff (raadadviseurs) in the prime minister’s 
Council of Ministers and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are 
absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, such bureaucratic coordination is undermined 
by insufficient or absent informal political coordination. 
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 Digital technologies are not abundantly used in Dutch interministerial 
coordination. Like in ICT use across government in general, different 
departments use different systems whose interoperability is low or absent. 
Although the Legis project aspires to a more integrated ICT approach in the 
Dutch legislative system, results have been poor. For example, it is impossible 
as a non-insider to trace progress in legislative work on a particular bill, let 
alone to have an overview of all bills in preparation. Digitalization in 
legislation and interministerial coordination in the Netherlands clearly lags 
behind that in the United Kingdom or Finland. 
 
In 2019, two important leaders in the push for improved ICT use within 
governmental departments resigned, and there are severe disagreements 
between the political and administrative levels of the Department of Internal 
Affairs and the leadership of the ICT Assessment Bureau, which was 
established in 2015 to coordinate ICT projects and contain cost overruns. 
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 In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields: 
environmental-impact assessments (EIMs) and administrative-burden-
reduction assessments (ABRAs). 
 
Environmental impact assessments are legally prescribed for projects (e.g., 
infrastructure, water management, tourism, rural projects, garbage processing, 
energy and industry) with foreseeable large environmental impacts. Initiators 
of such projects are obliged to produce an environmental impact report that 
specifies the environmental impacts of the intended project and activities and 
includes major alternatives. Environmental research and multi-criteria analysis 
are the standard methods used. 
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The development of a method for ex ante evaluation of intended legislation 
regarding compliance costs to business and citizens was entrusted in 1998 to 
an ad hoc, temporary, but independent advisory commission called the 
Advisory Board on Administrative Burden Reduction (ACTAL). In 2011, 
some policymakers suggested that ACTAL become a permanent rather than 
temporary body. The policy philosophy on administrative regulation was at 
that time already shifting from (always negative) “burden reduction” to 
(prudentially positive and strategic) “appropriate regulation.” After evaluating 
its impact, the government decided in 2017 that ACTAL would be succeeded 
by a formal advisory body, the Advisory Body on Assessment of Regulatory 
Burdens (Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, ATR). At present, the ATR is 
involved in assessing a large number of regulations concerning topics such as 
small and medium-sized enterprises, social care, education and EU 
regulations. 
 
Meanwhile, the Dutch government has been developing an integrated impact 
assessment framework for policy and legislation, which ought to be applied by 
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het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk 
 
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal 
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Quality of RIA 
Process 
Score: 8 
 RIAs are obliged to identify one or several alternatives to the option chosen by 
an initiator. According to Advisory Board on Administrative Burden 
Reduction (ATR) guidelines, alternative options for administrative-burden-
reduction assessments (ABRAs) are investigated. In principle, the option 
involving the greatest cost reduction ought to be selected. The extent to which 
practice follows theory is not known. Stakeholders and decision-makers have 
been involved in the process of producing RIAs, making burden-reduction 
analyses more effective. The status of ATR as an independent body for 
evaluation has been changed to a legally established permanent advisory body. 
 
Stakeholders and interested parties, typically including semi-public bodies and 
the lobbyists for commercial and/or professional associations (e.g., 
representing SMEs, social- and medical-care professionals, or farmers), are 
generally consulted in the intra- or interministerial preparation of bills and 
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policy proposals. Before a draft is passed onto the Council of Ministers, a 
proposal has to pass a wide range of quality tests, for example regarding 
budgetary effects, business effects, administrative-burden effects, and societal 
and environmental effects. After the proposal passes the administrative-burden 
test, the ATR (as a semi-independent watchdog) scrutinizes it once again. In 
some cases, departments publicize a draft bill as part of an e-consultation 
process to solicit feedback from citizens, but this practice is exceptional. 
 
Given the continued and widespread complaints about regulatory burdens 
(e.g., by dentists, general practitioners, youth workers, nurses, farmers and 
shopkeepers, to mention just a few), there is some question as to the 
effectiveness of regulatory-burden-reduction campaigns and the efficacy of the 
ATR as an independent watchdog. 
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 In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields: 
environmental impact assessments (EIMs) and administrative-burden-
reduction assessments (ABRAs). EIMs have been legally mandated since 
1987. Anyone who needs a government license for initiating substantial spatial 
or land-use projects with potentially harmful environmental impacts is obliged 
to research and disclose potential project impacts. More than 1,000 EIM 
reports have been administratively and politically processed. They guarantee 
that environmental and sustainability considerations play a considerable role in 
government decision-making. However, environmental impact assessments are 
sometimes subordinated to economic impact assessments. There are no 
systematic social – or, for example, health – impact assessments. In 2017, the 
DNB (Dutch National Bank) announced checks on whether firms in the 
financial sector have sufficiently explored the risks of climate change in their 
policies. In the water sector, similar stress tests of policies by water 
management boards, and municipal and local water management/emergency 
plans are being prepared. In 2018, the results of recent climate-change 
platform debates, and negotiations between government, business and other 
stakeholders were elaborately scrutinized and re-calculated by the Planning 
Bureau for the Living Environment. 
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Nevertheless, as reported elsewhere (see “Environment”), the Dutch 
government has regularly helped economic sectors (farmers, fishermen, civil 
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Quality of Ex 
Post Evaluation 
Score: 6 
 The General Audit Chamber (Algemene Rekenkamer) scrutinizes ex post 
policy evaluations by ministerial departments. Since 2000, the chamber has 
reported its findings to parliament on the third Wednesday in May each year. 
In 2012, the government introduced the Regulation for Regular Evaluation 
Studies, which specifies research criteria for assessing policy efficiency, goal 
achievement, evidence-based policymaking and subsidy-based policies. Yet, 
time and again, the chamber has reported deficits in goal achievement and 
weaknesses in goal formulation, which undermine the quality of ex post 
evaluation research. Other weaknesses in policy evaluation studies include the 
lack of citizen perspectives, inability to accurately calculate societal costs and 
benefits, overreliance on input from implementing organizations for evidence 
and lack of public access to many evaluations. In line with the general trend 
toward more instrumental advice, over the last couple of years, the General 
Audit Chamber has focused its attention on specific points in departmental 
agendas. 
 
Moreover, there are a wide range of additional non-obligatory evaluations 
produced by ministerial departments, parliament, government-sponsored 
knowledge institutes, the ombudsman, implementation bodies and quasi-
independent non-governmental bodies. Since evaluation findings are just one 
factor in designing new or adjusting existing policies, it is not clear how much 
policy learning actually occurs. A recent study commissioned by the minister 
of finance assessed past evaluations and their use. The study confirmed that 
although “no other country evaluates so many of its policies,” policymaking 
civil servants and members of parliament are less sensitive to the outcomes of 
previous policies than to images and incidents (in the press). Moreover, 
obstruction and disinterestedness contribute to methodological weaknesses in 
many of the evaluation studies, this assessment found. For example, although 
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the government agreement stipulates that a new policy decriminalizing the use 
of hashish may be experimentally tested at the local level, interference in the 
study’s design has already made a politically unbiased evaluation of results as 
good as impossible.  
 
Dutch ex post evaluators closely follow international trends of “evidence 
informed” and “behavioral knowledge” evaluation studies. There has been a 
tendency to move away from a focus on single, case-specific ex post 
evaluation studies to a focus on the construction of broader, more balanced 
departmental knowledge portfolios, in which ex post evaluation studies are 
embedded as elements in a larger body of knowledge accessible to 
policymakers and other participants in policy subsystems. It is not yet clear to 
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 International references to the “polder model” as a form of consensus-building 
testify to the Dutch reputation for negotiating public support for public 
policies, sometimes as a precondition for parliamentary approval. In this form 
of neo-corporatism and network governance, the government consults 
extensively with vested interest groups in the economy and/or civil society 
during policy preparation and attempts to involve them in policy 
implementation. It has been a strong factor in the mode of political operation 
and public policymaking deployed by the Rutte governments. Recent 
examples include the public debate on pension reform, the national summit on 
climate policy following the Paris Accords (involving five sectoral platforms: 
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electricity, built environment, industry, agriculture and land use, and mobility), 
and public health consultations (focusing on obesity, smoking and 
“problematic” alcohol consumption). The Rutte I and Rutte II councils of 
ministers produced societal agreements on austerity measures, housing policy, 
care policy, energy policy and socioeconomic policy.  
 
In spite of its apparent revival, this mode of politics and policymaking is under 
stress. Trade unions have suffered due to an erosion of representativeness and 
increasing fragmentation, although employers’ associations have been less 
affected. Quite recently, an agreement for a one-off additional budget for 
education, negotiated between the minister of education and teachers’ unions, 
fell apart because the unions’ negotiators turned out to have ignored their own 
constituency, which insisted on the implementation of structural measures. 
Another criticism is that results may be politically pre-cooked depending on 
who is sitting at the negotiation table. For example, in the negotiations over 
the climate agreement, this criticism applied to the discussions on energy and 
health issues, in which the results allegedly strongly reflected the interests of 
the energy and pharmaceutical industries.  
 
Another criticism of the process is that it leads to sluggish policymaking, 
creating a “musical chair” process in which the responsibilities of government, 
business and influential civil society or non-governmental organizations 
remain blurred and undermine effective decision-making. The recent revival 
may owe more to the fact that none of the Rutte cabinets have been able to rely 
on solid parliamentary support than to any renewed vigor on the part of 
business, labor unions and civil society associations. A side-effect of the 
reviving “polder” tradition within a more fragmented political landscape may 
be the emergence of an extensive network of professional lobbyists. There are 
signs that business lobbies have notched conspicuous successes. For example, 
the highly contested (and eventually dropped) proposal to abandon the 
dividend tax proved to be linked to Unilever’s broken promise (made during 
the cabinet-formation process) to move its headquarters to the Netherlands. 
 
Since 2011, national departments involved in developing new policies and 
legislative projects have been able to use the internet to consult with citizens, 
thereby avoiding some of the problems associated with the traditional 
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 The Informatie Rijksoverheid service responds to frequently asked questions 
by citizens over the internet, telephone and email. In the age of “mediacracy,” 
the government has sought to make policy communication more coherent, 
relying on the National Information Service (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, RVD), 
which is formally a part of the prime minister’s Department for General 
Affairs, and whose Director General is present at Council of Ministers 
meetings and is responsible for communicating policies and the prime 
minister’s affairs to the media. The government has streamlined and 
coordinated its external communications at the line-ministry level.  
 
Another effort to engage in centralized, coherent communication has involved 
replacing departmentally run televised information campaigns with a unified, 
thematic approach (e.g., safety). These efforts to have government speak with 
“one mouth” appear to have been fairly successful. For example, the 
information communicated by the government regarding the downing of a 
passenger plane with 196 Dutch passengers over Ukraine on 17 July 2014 and 
its aftermath was timely, adequate and demonstrated respect for the victims 
and the needs of their families.  
 
The continual technological innovation in information and communication 
technologies has led policy communication to adapting to the new 
possibilities. New developments are focused on responding more directly to 
citizen questions, exploring new modes of behavioral change, and utilizing 
internet-based citizen participation and communication channels in 
policymaking and political decision-making. For example, in 2011 the Dutch 
government decided to participate in the global Open Government Partnership. 
But in 2017 the Dutch government was criticized for structurally misleading 
and insufficient communication on issues of animal disease and food safety 
due to prioritizing agricultural interests over public health. In general, 
government communication occurs in an increasingly challenging media 
environment in which competition, polarization, trolling and “fake news” 
represent major challenges. The line between government communication and 
information, and defending government policies is becoming more and more 
blurred. 
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In 2019, in response to repeated criticism that the language used in official 
communications was unclear, the government decided to create an “Instant 
Clarity Brigade” (Direct Duidelijk Brigade) to assist departmental 
policymakers in writing more understandable proposals, rules and decrees. 
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 According to an optimistic estimate by a leading newspaper, the Rutte II 
government implemented 80% of its policy initiatives during its four-year 
term. Of the 271 initiatives, 158 were successful and 59 were (partial) failures. 
Consequently, the Rutte II government justifiably claimed credit for renewed 
economic growth, the restoration of budgetary equilibrium and the passage of 
important austerity measures (e.g., an increase in working hours, reduced 
public funding for home care, a gradual decrease in tax relief on mortgages 
and caps on healthcare costs). In its first year, the Rutte III cabinet realized 
five of its 36 officially announced legislative initiatives; two of which simply 
involved abolishing (consultative referendum, fiscal reduction for home-
owners) existing laws. In its second year, two of its big initiatives, a pension 
agreement and a climate agreement, were achieved. However, in its overall 
assessment of government performance in 2018 – 2019, the General Audit 
Chamber, in an especially pessimistic annual report, found most departmental 
reports inadequate owing to “bad memory” and inadequate records. For the 
first time, it also identified illegal expenditures.  
 
Recent policy failures and implementation gaps can be found in virtually all 
policy areas and departments. This is no longer denied even in parliament. 
Such failures are generally considered to have resulted from the cuts imposed 
under the austerity policies of Rutte I and II. Inspectorates in the building, 
education and healthcare sectors are now considered weak. A similar situation 
is evident in the consumer and privacy protection field, especially with regard 
to the digitalization of citizen registrations and the accessibility of online-only 
government services. However, in the second half of 2019, the neoliberal 
austerity policy model was largely abandoned, and plans for new and 
additional public expenditures were announced. 
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The national government has devolved a significant number of tasks to 
subnational governments, which makes government and administrative 
responsibilities more fuzzy, and policy performance harder to evaluate. The 
share of local governments’ payment obligations that could be fulfilled 
decreased from 42% in 2009 to 35% in 2017 and was expected to decrease 
more in 2018. Provincial and local audit chambers do what they can, but the 
amount and scope of decentralized tasks is simply too large for their capacity 
at this moment. Policy implementation in the fields of policing, youth care and 
care for the elderly in particular are increasingly sources of complaints by 
citizens and professionals, and thus becoming matters of grave concern.  
 
The government frequently formulates policy goals that are more far-reaching 
than those pursued in practice. The shift from an austerity model to a more 
expansionary spending policy in September 2019 will make it harder to make 
realistic evaluations of policy-implementation effectiveness. In academic and 
professional evaluation circles, a debate is emerging on how to tailor 
evaluation research designs to the need for more policy-oriented learning as 
the legitimation for policy change. 
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 Dutch ministers’ hands are tied by party discipline; government/coalition 
agreements (which they have to sign in person during an inaugural meeting of 
the new Council of Ministers); ministerial responsibility to the States General; 
and the dense consultation and negotiation processes taking place within their 
own departments, other departments in the interdepartmental administrative 
“front gates” and ministerial committees. Ministers have strong incentives to 
represent their ministerial interests, which do not necessarily directly reflect 
government coalition policy. The record-long formation period for the Rutte 
III government, which consists of four coalition partners (VVD, CDA, CU, 
and D66), resulted in a detailed government agreement underwritten by all 
four parties and their ministers. However, structural cleavages (along left-
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right, immigration and ethical issues) between the coalition parties have led to 
considerable inter-cabinet tensions, and thus opportunities for individual 
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 Given the Prime Minister Office’s lack of capacity to coordinate and follow up 
on policy proposal and bills, systematic monitoring of line ministries’ 
implementation activities is scarcely possible. In the event of crises, ad hoc 
monitoring does occur. Parliamentary debate on ministerial monitoring should 
have been limited to a well-defined set of “focus subjects” in full accordance 
with the policy-program budgeting philosophy developed in the 1970s. 
However, recent political developments (the election campaigns in 2010 and a 
Council of Ministers breakdown in 2012) have prevented this. In 2012, yet 
another system of program budgeting – “responsible budgeting” – was 
introduced.  
 
Since 2013 to 2014, General Audit Chamber studies have indeed focused on 
particular subjects, and following some political consultation, on departmental 
domains. In 2012, the General Audit Chamber reported that just 50% of 
governmental policy initiatives were evaluated, most of these evaluations 
incorrectly were considered effectiveness studies. Hence, parliament remains 
largely ill-informed about the success of governmental goals and objectives. 
The problem may well be that members of parliament don’t really care 
because they are more concerned by achieving future projects than reflecting 
on past performance. In 2016, the government cut financing for the General 
Audit Chamber by €1.2 billion, meaning a personnel reduction from 273 to 
233 full-time employees and outsourcing research for specific programs. In 
2017, the audit chamber launched a website for monitoring ministerial 
compliance of audit chamber recommendations. Four out of five 
recommendations made by the audit chamber were complied with, according 
to ministerial self-reports. In 2019, delegation to line ministries resulted in 
surprise policy failures with regard to sustainability targets, dioxide emissions 
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 A 2016 evaluation of the national Framework Law on Agencies/Bureaucracies 
has insufficient scope according to a considerable number of members of 
parliament: too many agencies are exempted from (full) monitoring directives, 
while annual reports are delivered too late or are incomplete. Hence, the 
government lacks adequate oversight over the dozens of billions of euros of 
expenses managed by bodies at some distance from the central government. In 
2014 – 2018, it became clear that several oversight agencies and inspectorates, 
such as the Inspectorate for Healthcare and the Authority for Consumers and 
Markets, were not quite up to their tasks.  
The national government’s ICT projects too have been improperly monitored, 
resulting in huge time and cost overruns. The Social Insurance Bank (Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank, SVB) was for far too long unable to disburse personal 
benefits to special-education students and senior citizens eligible for day and 
home care on time and in the correct amount. The Implementing Institute for 
Workers’ Insurances (Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, UVW) 
has long struggled with apparently unsolvable problems, including delays in 
medical check-ups and increasing levels of fraud, while the inaccessibility of 
its ICT system is undermining communication with clients. Unemployment 
benefit fraud by immigrants with jobs went unpunished for years. 
 
Parliament and journalists normally evaluate inspectorates on the basis of the 
number of unexpected failures, as well as through formal criteria of ministerial 
responsibility and accountability. This normally leads to considerable criticism 
and a call for more robust ministerial oversight. Yet, as independent 
government organizations focused on specific societal task areas (healthcare, 
food safety, customs clearance, transportation safety, etc.), inspectorates are 
meant to have a relatively wide scope for discretionary actions. In 2013, the 
Scientific Council of Government Policy (WRR) formulated a number of 
principles broadly defining the task of inspectors. This view stressed 
inspectors’ societal function, the evidence of societal outcomes, a governance 
approach, a reflexive approach and attention to core values. In 2019, the 
Inspection Council (Inspectieraad) published a report in which several experts 
judged the sector’s progress against this broader view. In a very general way, 
their conclusion was the current legal structure and the influence of ministerial 
oversight result in an inspection approach that is top-down and inside-out. The 
council advocates a more flexible bottom-up and outside-in approach that 
involved meaningful alliances between inspectorates and key actors in the 
field of governance and technological change. 
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 Decentralization and integration subsidies comprise 14% of all income from 
the general fund (Gemeentefonds). Policy-related national subsidies have 
decreased as a proportion of total income (falling from 62% in 1990 to 34% in 
2011) and in number (from over 400 in 1985 to less than 50 at present). As of 
2015, the national government has pursued a far-reaching decentralization of 
policy tasks (in youth work, chronic patient care, social benefits, worker-
activation employment programs). However, local-government budgets are 
supposed to contribute to meeting the European Monetary Union 3% 
government-deficit norm by accepting a decrease in their total budget. In 
2014, local governments on average received €1,091 per inhabitant. In 2017, 
this amount has increased to €1,645. Nevertheless, in the social-policy domain, 
municipal governments still ran a very considerable deficit in 2018 –2019.  
 
Local governments will be expected to “do more with less” in the coming 
years. The Center for Economic Policy Analysis recently proposed that local 
governments expand their local tax base; combined with a decrease in national 
taxes, this would simultaneously be good for the national economy and local 
democracy. The Association of Dutch Local Governments (Vereniging 
Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG) has installed a special advisory commission to 
look into the issue. The national government and VNG appear to be locked in 
a continuous round of negotiations over structural measures concerning the 
Gemeentefonds. Meanwhile, in the background, there is a political discussion 
concerning the future of municipal government: Should municipal 
governments deliver services to citizens that transcend present municipal 
boundaries, or should municipalities remain governance hubs of low-threshold 
accessibility and participatory governance? This l  atter path is exactly what 
has been proposed in the youth-care sector, the only field in which the national 
government has conceded the failure of decentralization and the current task 
funding model. Similar problems are evident across the entire educational 
sector, especially with regard to a shortage of teachers due to low salaries, task 
overload, large class sizes and a lack of professional freedom. These issues 
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 Dutch local governments are hybrids of “autonomous” and “co-government” 
forms. However, local autonomy is defined mostly negatively as pertaining to 
those tasks left to local discretion because they are not explicitly mentioned as 
national policy issues. Co-government is financially and materially 
constrained in rather extensive detail by ministerial grants. Increasingly, the 
Dutch national government uses administrative and financial tools to steer and 
influence local policymaking. Some would go so far as to claim that these 
tools have in sum created a culture of quality control and accountability that 
paralyzes local governments, violating the European Charter for Local 
Government. This is due in part to popular and political opinion that local 
policymaking, levels of local-service delivery and local taxes ought to be equal 
everywhere in the (small) country.  
 
Starting in 2016, the Local Government Fund (Gemeentefonds) budget has 
increased in step with increases in the national government’s budget. The 
transfer of policy competencies in many domains of care imply that local 
discretion has increased, sometimes resulting in different treatment for similar 
cases by local governments in different parts of the country. 
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 Local governments themselves also try to meet mutually agreed-upon national 
standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons 
and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been 
organizing voluntary peer reviews of each other’s executive capacities. In 
2009, the Association of Dutch Local Governments established the Quality 
Institute of Dutch Local Governments (Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse 
Gemeenten, KING, renamed VNG Realisatie B.V.). As part of a knowledge 
platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the Association of Dutch Local 
Governments produces a comparative report on the status of local 
governments (previously De staat van Gemeenten, now the Gemeentelijke 
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Monitor Social Domain) that collects relevant policy evaluations and assists 
local governments in their management of information. In 2019, new task 
fields and dashboards were added to this tool. Nevertheless, due to the 
implementation of strong decentralization plans, including funding cutbacks, it 
is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of municipal 
services will diminish. Instead of strict output equality, official discourse now 
refers to “situational equality.” This development is counteracted by increasing 
cooperation by municipalities in transboundary tasks (e.g., garbage collection 
and treatment, youth care, and care for the elderly). 
 
National standards are implicit in the nationwide local-government fund 
model, which allocates a share of national tax revenues to the roughly 360 
local governments on the basis of numerous variables. This funding today 
comprises 86% of local-government budgets. Standards diverge, depending on 
how local governments handle policy problems in these domains. This in part 
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 In the Netherlands, regulatory enforcement by administrative bodies rather 
than legal prosecution by legal authorities is used to counter the efforts of 
criminal organizations to penetrate the formal economy and government 
administrations. Attention has been focused on illegal-drug production, traffic 
(notably in harbor cities, but also in the relatively empty rural areas of the 
country’s south and east), transportation and trade, as well as on human 
trafficking (women, refugees). Special police teams, mayors of larger cities, 
national and local public prosecutors, and fiscal detectives collaborate in 
detecting drug and human trafficking gangs – or, through the use of ordinary 
administrative laws, to “harass” drug and human traffickers to such an extent 
that they close or, more frequently, relocate. Studies trying to estimate the 
effectiveness of such methods have been methodologically contested and are 
thus inconclusive. It is in connection to illegal drugs and human trafficking, 
that mayors of larger cities and sometimes small, rural villages become “crime 
fighters.” Another attention area is the integrity of political and administrative 
bodies. In the recent local elections, some municipalities and political parties 
screened aspiring new council members’ civic conduct status to a hitherto 
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unusual extent. Integrity screening for police and customs officers, and 
sometimes high-level civil servants has also been strengthened. Recently, two 
aldermen in The Hague were accused by public prosecutors of accepting 
bribes by local entrepreneurs. The narrowing of the criminological definition 
of “undermining”   has been criticized by those who examine big corporations 
and financial institutions who abuse regulations and lax oversight, commit 
fraud and corruption, or do not comply with environmental regulations, 
especially regarding agriculture and chemistry. It is often claimed that 
regulations are not strictly enforced with regard to white-collar crimes, the 
implication being one of a classist justice system. However, it seems that the 
Dutch government overall tries to enforce rules effectively and fairly but 
increasingly appears to fail. 
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 Government reform has been on and off the agenda for at least 40 years. In 
this time there has been no substantial reform of the original government 
structure, which dates back to the 1848 constitution, “Thorbecke’s house.” The 
Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is 
still part of the executive, not the judiciary. A brief experiment with 
consultative referendums was nipped in the bud early in the Rutte III cabinet 
rule. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors 
are appointed by the national government. In spring 2013, the Rutte II 
government largely withdrew its drastic plans to further reduce the number of 
local and municipal governments. Given the Dutch citizens’ relatively high 
level of trust in national institutions, it could be argued there was no need for 
reforms. 
 
The most recent episode in this saga of institutional stability (or inertia) was a 
report by the Remkes Commission, which advocated state reforms rebalancing 
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the demands of democracy and the rule of law. Among its 83 
recommendations, the report advocated for the direct election of politicians 
tasked with forming new cabinets, the introduction of a binding corrective 
referendum process, the establishment of a Constitutional Court tasked with 
assessing the constitutionality of parliamentary laws, and procedures that 
would give voters greater influence over who is elected to parliament. The 
commission also called for a new political culture that would accept less 
detailed government coalition agreements, and would be more willing to 
consider the possibility of minority governments. 
 
Information about EU policies and decisions reach the Dutch parliament 
through a large number of special channels. Although the number of civil 
servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has 
undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative 
procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and 
legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of 
“Dutch interests first” translates into a political attitude of unwillingness 
(beyond what has already been achieved) to adapt domestic political and 
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 The Netherlands has been a protagonist in all forms of international 
cooperation since the Second World War. However, research has shown that 
since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by 
years) before being transposed into Dutch law. The present-day popular 
attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or 
rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated 
by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration 
policies; the decline in popular support and subsequent lowering of the 1%-of-
government-spending-norm for development aid; the shift in the government’s 
attitude toward being a net contributor to EU finances; and the rejection of the 
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EU referendum and the rejection of the EU treaty with Ukraine in a non-
binding referendum.  
 
The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation 
and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since 
2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-
related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality – 
that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. However, Dutch ministers 
do play important roles in the coordination of financial policies at the EU 
level. Indeed, it is only since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis 
that the need for better coordination of international policymaking by the 
Dutch government has led to reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. 
The sheer number of EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces 
the Dutch prime minister to act as a minister of general and European affairs, 
with heavy support from the minister of finance. The Dutch and the Germans 
routinely put the brakes on further unification of EU policies in the policy 
domain of banking and finance; moreover, the Dutch have resisted efforts to 
dismantle tax and financial rules that have turned the Netherlands into a tax 
haven for American and Russian capital. The vice-president of the European 
Commission, Timmermans, is a former Dutch minister. In the close race to 
succeed Juncker as president of the European Commission, he was the lead 
candidate for the Socialists in the European Parliament, but ultimately lost. 
The Dutch minister for Development Aid and Trade plays an important role in 
fostering better cooperation between governments, international companies 
and international aid organizations through transnational treaties on production 
and supply chains. The Netherlands will be part of the UN Security Council 
for the next year. 
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 There have only been two visible changes in the institutional practices of the 
Dutch government at the national level. One is that the monarch was stripped 
of participation in cabinet-formation processes in 2012; the second chamber or 
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senate now formally directs that process. The effect on government formation 
was very mixed, with a historically rapid formation in 2012 and the longest-
lasting coalition formation process in 2017. The second change was the 
informal adaptation to lower levels of parliamentary support on the part of the 
Rutte I and II governments. Informal coordination processes between 
government ministers, and all members of the senate and second chamber have 
become crucial for governing at the national level. Following provincial 
elections in 2019, this also applies to the present Rutte III cabinet. 
 
Two open organizational-reform crises have emerged in recent times that 
threaten citizens’ well-being in the long run. The first is the underfunded, 
understaffed and ill-considered transfer of policy responsibility to municipal 
and local governments within important domains such as youth care, 
healthcare and senior-citizen care. However, experiments in local budgeting 
and deliberative and participatory policymaking (Code Oranje, Civocracy) 
have gained a modicum of traction at the local level. 
 
Second, there is a looming reform crisis in the justice and policing system, 
which undermines the government’s task of protecting citizens’ security. The 
reform of the policing system from regional or local bodies into a single big 
national organization is stagnating; police officers have mounted strikes based 
on wage and working-condition issues; and the top echelon of the police 
leadership is in disarray. One manifestation of this crisis in the organizational 
reform of policing has been the polarization of views on the role of mayors in 
fighting local (often drug-related) crime. Some observers want mayors to be 
crime fighters; others argue that the office holder should merely stay informed 
regarding prosecutions and policy actions. The digitalization of the justice 
system and the reduction in the number of courts, in addition to imposed 
cutbacks, has wreaked havoc within the judicial branch of government. There 
is a crisis in the relations between the political and the bureaucratic elements, 
given that the Department of Justice and Security is supposed to provide 
political guidance to both of these reform movements. 
 
Although institutional arrangements are monitored regularly (Scientific 
Council of the Government on Citizen Self-Reliance, Council for Public 
Administration on Local Democracy and annual reports by the national 
Council of State), recommendations and plans are not followed up due to a 
lack of political will. In 2019, the Council of State warned that there was a risk 
of subjecting parliamentary legislation to the outcomes of poldering practices 
that effectively give too much power to organized and vested stakeholder 
interests (e.g., in the context of the big agreements on housing, pensions and 
climate). 
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 No major changes have taken place in strategic arrangements or capacities 
beyond what has already been mentioned regarding externally driven policy 
coordination in fiscal and economic matters. Generally, strategic capacity is 
rather weak, though there are signs that government officials and politicians 
are actively considering and in some cases have even adopted proposals for 
strategic change. However, due to the long period of austerity, which came to 
an end only in 2019, strategic capacities have not been strengthened. 
Experiments in participatory budgeting and local democracy may somewhat 
harness citizen knowledge and expertise to local government. A policy mood, 
which is only slowly adapting to European developments, may also result in 
some institutional reform over the mid-term. 
 
  
II. Executive Accountability 
  




 Dutch citizens claim to spend slightly more time than the average European 
citizen on collecting political information. Nevertheless, the broader public 
does not seem to be well-informed on a wide range of government policies. 
This is due not to a lack of information, but many people find political 
information complicated and/or uninteresting, they often do not pay much 
attention to it. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal-Cultureel 
Planbureau, SCP) found in a 2012 survey that 28% of respondents thought 
politics was too complicated for them to understand, while 60% thought it was 
too complex for most others.  
 
In addition to disinterest and an increasing knowledge gap between 
educational levels, increasing (foreign-led) efforts to disseminate 
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disinformation and create “fake news” have had a deleterious effect on 
knowledge levels regarding political issues and decision-making. Moreover, 
studies conducted during the 2017 election showed that an increasing number 
of citizens from the younger cohorts have begun to avoid political news. 
 
Research among voters in local elections shows that citizens hold the national 
government accountable for local policy. Moreover, they have more trust in 
local political institutions (mayor, aldermen, political parties) than in their 
national counterparts. Furthermore, people participate in local elections, but at 
much reduced rates in more participatory alternatives, while the public views 
the physical environment as the country’s most pressing policy issue. 
 
In 2018 – 2019, the Our Money (Ons Geld) citizen initiative, which managed 
to put issues of money and (public) debt on the agenda, represented an 
exceptional case of active citizenship. One of its results was a WRR report 
recommending more diversity in the financial sector, an end to excessive 
debts, better preparation for the next financial crisis, and the establishment of a 
public bank for citizen savings. Another example of civic mobilization 
involved the 2018 mobilization of residents in areas plagued by airplane noise 
associated with Schiphol Airport, and the clear impact that activists and lobby 
groups had on the expansion plan for Schiphol Airport. Research by Bovens 
and Wille found that differences in education levels have become increasingly 
salient factors when it comes to citizens’ powers in processing policy 
information, political judgments about the European Union, issues of 
immigration and integration, and political leadership.  
 
The SCP recently found that Dutch citizens split evenly over the issue of more 
or less direct influence by citizens. It is the less educated who demand more 
political influence, whereas higher educated citizens, especially those with 
tertiary qualifications, do not support the idea. A recent study into citizen 
attitudes to the European Union, undertaken by TNS/Kantar Nipo and 
commissioned by the Green Left party, found that Dutch citizens are caught in 
a dependence-cum-distrust situation: they instinctively distrust the European 
Union and would resist transferring more national powers to the EU level, but 
simultaneously believe that the European Union should have greater influence 
over most policy domains. 
 
There have been a wide and broad range of initiatives across all levels of 
government in all kinds of citizen engagement projects, from interactive 
policymaking to citizen-budgets and citizen-juries, youth councils and local 
referendums, just to name a few. Public apathy in many participatory options 
and low levels of knowledge on policies co-exists with widespread discontent 
with politics and governance. A surge in street protests and large-scale 
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demonstrations was evident in 2019. This was driven in part by the Dutch 
counterparts of the French “yellow vests,” students and other younger people 
united in Extinction Rebellion, and climate and animal activists. However, 
teachers, farmers and building-industry employees (and employers) all 
launched one or more mass demonstrations against government policies. 
Overall, it appears that citizen-initiated efforts to exert power outside and 
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 The most important and high-prestige knowledge institutes (CPB, PBL, SCP 
and WRR) regularly publish comprehensive, timely and accurate data. Such 
information is used in the annual information packages that accompany 
parliamentary deliberation and decision-making on the national budget. 
Throughout the year, government provides topical information about issues 
pertaining to ministerial policy agendas on the government website. For 
politically engaged citizens, it is thus quite possible to be well-informed on 
government policies. In the Edelman Trust Index 2019, the Netherlands scored 
a relatively high and unchanged 54 with regard to trust in government 
information, indicating an average “neutral” position falling between trust and 
distrust. Political parties sometimes openly express distrust in the numbers 
released by the high-prestige knowledge institutes if these contradict their 
policy preferences.  
 
In other cases (e.g., the WODC research into drugs policy, the outbreak of Q-
fever in rural areas, the continued use of carcinogenic agents in military paint 
and sensitivity to earthquakes in areas of gas exploitation), the government 
interfered in the findings of government-sponsored research. Open 
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government regulation offers public access to most routine government 
information. Though the law also offers decision-makers plenty of 
opportunities to withhold or delay information if “necessary” for political 
convenience. There are several blatant cases of government misinformation 
and/or information delays, frequently because civil servants are alleged to 
have belatedly or incompletely informed ministers in order to shield ministers 
from media scrutiny or to spin the information.  
 
Investigative journalism articles published in De Correspondent and Follow 
the Money have disclosed hidden governance issues and government 
facilitation of structural business lobbying arrangements. 
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 A comprehensive study on the information exchange between the States 
General and government in the Netherlands over the past 25 years concludes: 
“In a mature democracy the primacy of information provision to parliament 
ought to be in the hands of parliament itself; but in the Netherlands in 2010 de 
jure and de facto this is hardly the case. … De facto the information arena in 
which the cabinet and the parliament operate is largely defined and controlled 
by the cabinet.” This state of affairs reflects the necessity of forming 
government coalitions supported by the majority of the States General. As an 
institution, the States General is not necessarily a unified actor. As basically 
every parliamentary vote can result in the downfall of a government, this 
creates mutual dependence for survival: parliamentary groups supporting the 
government (part of the legislature) and government ministers (the executive) 
become fused, which threatens the democratic principle of control and 
accountability.  
 
Moreover, the States General’s institutional resources are modest. 
Approximately 600 staff assist parliamentarians in developing legislation, 
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knowledge storage and use, and ICT issues. Dutch members of parliament in 
large parliamentary factions have one staffer each, while members of 
parliament of smaller factions share just a few staffers. Members of parliament 
of coalition parties are usually better informed than opposition members of 
parliament. Members of parliament do have the right to summon and 
interrogate ministers, although the quality of the question-and-answer game is 
typified as: “Posing the right questions is an art; getting correct answers is 
grace.” Oversight and control in the Dutch States General is the prerogative of 
the departmentally organized permanent parliamentary committees, usually 
composed of members of parliament with close affinity to the policy issues of 
the department involved. The small Parliamentary Bureau for Research and 
Public Expenditure does not produce independent research, but provides 
assistance to the parliament. 
 
Policy and program evaluations are conducted by the departments themselves, 
or by the General Audit Chamber (which has more information-gathering 
powers than the States General). Another more standardized mechanism is the 
annual Accountability Day, when the government reports on its policy 
achievements over the last year. Direct day-to-day contacts with officials are 
fuzzy and unsatisfactory due to the nature and interpretation of guidelines, and 
formal hearings between members of parliament and departmental officials are 
extremely rare. Members of parliament can ask officials to testify under oath 
only in the case of formal parliamentary surveys or investigations, but this is 
considered an extraordinarily time-consuming instrument and is used only in 
exceptional cases.  
 
At present, members of parliament are exploring the possibility of creating a 
so-called light parliamentary investigation as a less time-consuming format 
that is somewhere between a hearing and an investigation. In 2016, a majority 
of parliament requested such an investigation-light procedure following the 
publication of the Panama Papers. Formally, the States General may use the 
expertise of a governmental advisory body, but this process is closely 
supervised by the minister under whose departmental responsibility the 
respective advisory body functions. Only the Rathenau Institute (for scientific 
and technological issues) works exclusively for the States General. 
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 The government has to provide correct information to the States General 
(according to Article 68 of the constitution). However, this is often done 
somewhat defensively, in order to protect “ministerial responsibility to 
parliament” and a “free consultative sphere” with regard to executive 
communications. Providing the States General with internal memos, policy 
briefs (e.g., on alternative policy options), interdepartmental policy notes or 
advice from external consultants is viewed as infringing on the policy 
“intimacy” necessary for government-wide policy coordination, as well as on 
the state’s interests. As political scientist Hans Daalder has noted: “In practice, 
it is the ministers that decide on the provision of information requested.” 
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 Parliamentary committees may invite ministers to provide testimony or answer 
questions. Outright refusal to answer such a request occurs only rarely. 
Nevertheless, ministers often do not answer the questions in a forthright 
manner. Every week, parliamentarians have the opportunity to summon 
ministers and pose a seemingly unlimited number of questions. Recently, the 
minister for public health canceled international commitments in favor of 
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 Parliamentary committees can and often do invite experts to answer questions, 
or to facilitate the parliamentarian committee members in asking questions and 
interpreting the answers. Limited finances are usually the only real constraint 
on the number of experts summoned. 
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 Under the present government, there are 11 ministries and 12 (fixed) 
parliamentary committees (vaste kamercommissies). Only the prime minister’s 
Department of General Affairs lacks an analogous dedicated parliamentary 
committee. There are also fixed committees for interdepartmental 
policymaking on aggregate government expenditure, European affairs and 
foreign trade, and development aid. Parliamentary committees usually have 25 
members, representing all political parties with seats in the States General; 
they specialize in the policy issues of their dedicated departments and inform 
their peers (i.e., tell them how to vote as part of the party voting-discipline 
system). Members of parliament in these parliamentary oversight committees 
usually have close contacts with (deputy) ministers and high-level civil 
servants in the departments they oversee. Some observers see this as having 
contributed to a mutual interweaving of the executive and legislative branch of 
the government, thereby diminishing the executive’s accountability to the 
legislature. There are approximately 1,700 public and non-public committee 
meetings per year. By giving the committees the right to introduce, discuss and 
vote on motions (without a subsequent plenary debate and voting), the 
pressure on the plenary meetings could be reduced, and the oversight role of 
the committees strengthened. 
 
There has been a debate about the Committee on Security (Commissie 
Stiekem), which includes all leaders of the political parties, as some 
lawmakers have expressed concern about a lack of effective parliamentary 
oversight on crucial security issues. Very little is known about why such 
criticism was voiced and how members look at their role in the parliamentary 
committee. Other committees have public sessions (since 1966) that are 
broadcast, which means that there is more information available on the 
activities of the various political parties. Over time, the core of parliamentary 
activity has moved from the plenary sessions to the committees. 
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 Dutch public television and radio stations produce high-quality information 
programs analyzing government decisions on a daily basis. Of the 13 national 
public broadcasters in the Netherlands, eight may be said to consider it their 
task to inform the public about governmental affairs and decision-making. 
Nevertheless, the National Broadcasting Organization (NPO) is facing 
significant difficulties. Broadcasting organizations have lost as many as a 
million paying members in recent years, and members’ average age now is 58. 
Younger people are increasingly shifting to online sources. In political circles, 
the NPO is regarded as inert, complicated and wasteful. Right-wing populist 
parties criticize NPO as being left-leaning; for their part, liberals and 
commercial broadcasters see the NPO as being state-subsidized competition. 
Some political effort has been made to rebalance public and advertisement-
derived funding in order to make NPO budgets leaner. The recent government 
plans for reforming the NPO (less time for advertising, more cooperation 
between regional and local broadcasters, more online content, and more 
centralized leadership among a diverse set of broadcasting organizations) have 
drawn considerable criticism. 
 
Although newspaper circulation dropped again in 2018, a majority of Dutch 
citizens (55%) still read a newspaper or listened to the radio every day as 
recently as that year. Newspaper readers are to be found with relatively more 
frequency among the older and more highly educated population segments, 
and digital subscriptions are on the rise. The number of high-quality 
newspapers is fairly low. Younger people spend more time listening, watching 
and communicating on online platforms than do older people. Social-media 
platforms have become sources of news even for journalists. Regional and 
local newspapers in particular are experiencing severe financial troubles, 
owing to strong consolidation and concentration tendencies, and there has 
been a significant increase the number of one-paper and even no-paper cities. 
The internet is used daily by 86% of Dutch citizens. 
 
The Commissariat for the Media, which is tasked with monitoring the diversity 
and accuracy of media information about government and public-policy issues, 
has reported a continuous and severe concentration in the ownership of media 
outlets. Yet it has also stated that this has not as yet resulted in a lack of 
pluralism or an impoverishment of news sources and varieties. In the digital 
sphere, viewers and consumers clearly have more choices. The past decade has 
seen a large expansion in digital radio and television programming. This has 
resulted in a richer supply of broadcasters, bundled in so-called plus packages, 
and more recently of podcasts, which serve their target groups with theme-
specific broadcasts. Mediamonitor 2019 reported that compared to citizens of 
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other countries, Dutch citizens have high trust in media reports and report 
relatively little fake news.  
 
Public broadcasting – an important source of media plurality – is increasingly 
under pressure due to reductions in revenue from advertising (advertisers 
moving to social media). Moreover, the challenges of “fake news” and other 
methods of misinformation are significant, and the government has expressed 
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 The dominant political view is that government interference in private 
organizations like political parties is incompatible with the role of the state in a 
liberal democracy. A law for internal party democracy is appropriate for 
countries with a history of non-democratic governance (e.g., Germany, some 
states in southern Europe and in central and eastern Europe). However, in the 
Netherlands with its strong democratic tradition, many consider it superfluous. 
Several recent reports show the vulnerability of Dutch democracy to 
(international) manipulation through weak controls over and accountability for 
party finance, political campaigning and candidate selection. For example, 
some political parties deal with their representatives’ ethical issues within 
internal councils or executive organs, political parties report inflated numbers 
of formal members in order to boost state subsidies, and candidate lists and 
leadership-succession practices frequently lack transparency, illustrating 
Robert Michels’ thesis that political parties act as oligarchies. In addition, 
political parties are not obliged to have a membership organization or conduct 
internal decision-making practices democratically. One party (the anti-
immigrant party PVV) has only one member – its leader – and not even its 
members of parliament or local elected officials are able to join the party they 
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represent. Some political scientists therefore advocate a separate law on 
political parties and an independent (non-state) commission for oversight and 
enforcement.  
 
The very narrow basis of political parties is reflected in their membership 
figures. Political-party membership reached an all-time low of 285,851 in 
2015. It increased to 315,000 in 2018 (2.4% of the electorate), owing to an 
increase in young voters joining the Green Left and Forum for Democracy. 
Approximately 10% of party members are considered active. Frequently party 
activism is used as a launching pad for a political career. Across all major 
political parties, political activists and (semi-)professionals now dominate 
decision-making with regard to candidate lists and political agendas. Political 
parties are not bottom-up movements. Rather, they are intermediaries between 
political elites and their electorates, with political-party members as links. 
Intra-party democracy (e.g., party congresses, election of party leaders and 
intra-party referendums) sometimes prove to be counterproductive. One 
former minister of defense and Labor party member commented: “Party 
congresses don’t buy combat planes.” Party leadership succession, even in 
political parties with some tradition of intra-party democracy (e.g., Labor and 
D66), is not democratically regulated, but is often determined by opaque, 
“spontaneous” selection processes managed by party elites. 
 
The functional loss of political parties as clear representatives of social groups 
reverberates across the political system at all levels. Particularly the 
mobilization and integration into politics of lower-educated citizens has 
declined. Paired with the decline of the centrist parties (in particular the social-
democratic PvdA and Christian democratic CDA), the rise of more extremist 
and fringe parties, increasing electoral volatility, parliamentary fragmentation, 
polarization on particularly cultural issues and strong anti-establishment 
sentiments have created anxieties regarding the ethical practices of politicians 
and political parties. 
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 For a long time, there was no lobbying culture in the Netherlands in the usual 
sense. Instead, prominent members of labor unions and business associations 
are regular members of high-level informal networks that also include high-
level civil servants and politicians. Members of these networks discuss labor 
market and other important socioeconomic policy issues. These processes have 
become institutionalized. For instance, there are tripartite negotiations in 
which employers, employees and government experts are fixed discussion 
partners in the early stages of decision-making regarding labor issues. A 
similar process takes place for regular negotiations with economic interest 
associations. The analytic capacities of business and labor associations are 
well-developed. However, membership in trade unions has shown a 
continuous decline, with younger people in particular rejecting the idea of 
union membership. In addition, members and supporters of trade unions and 
professional and commercial associations frequently have more radical 
opinions than their representatives. In recent demonstrations, especially by 
farmers, teachers and hospital workers, association representatives in 
negotiations with the government were called back by their followers.  
 
However, this institutionalized “poldering  ” model has changed somewhat in 
recent years. There is now a Professional Association for Public Affairs 
(BVPA) that boasts 600 members (four times the number of parliamentarians) 
and a special public-affairs professorship at Leiden University. The 
professionalization of lobbying is said to be necessary in order to curb 
unethical practices such as the creation of foundations or crowdsourcing 
initiatives as a means of pursuing business interests. The “quiet politics” 
(Culpepper) of business lobbying through organizations such as the 
Commissie Tabaksblat, the Amsterdam (later Holland) Financial Center 
(Engelen), or Dutch Trade Investment Board (Follow the Money) has proven 
more than successful in influencing public policies on corporate governance, 
in easing regulation of the banking and financial sector, and in keeping taxes 
for business low. There is convincing evidence that in terms of election 
programs and promises, over the long run, Dutch households have been 
systematically disadvantaged compared to corporations and business. For 
example, tax reductions and exemptions for business were systematically 
higher than for ordinary citizens. 
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 Policymaking in the Netherlands has a strong neo-corporatist (“poldering”) 
tradition that systematically involves all kinds of interest associations in the 
early stages of the policymaking process – not just with regard to business and 
labor issues, but also in the education, care and health sectors. Owing to their 
well-established positions, associations such as the consumer association, all 
kinds of environmental NGOs, religious associations, municipal (Vereniging 
voor Nederlandse Gemeenten) and provincial interests (InterProvinciaal 
Overleg), and medical and other professional associations (e.g., teachers, 
universities, legal professions) can influence policymaking through the 
existing consensus-seeking structures. Trade-offs are actively negotiated with 
ministries, other involved governments, stakeholder organizations and even 
NGOs. Furthermore, non-economic interest organizations react to policy 
proposals by ministries and have a role in amending and changing the 
proposals in the early stages of the policymaking process. They may also 
become involved at a later stage, as policies are implemented. 
 
During the cabinet-formation process from April to October 2017, many non-
economic associations – representing the arts, education, the elderly and the 
care sector – inundated negotiators with policy memos and demands. For 
example, the citizen initiative led by Hugo Borst and Carin Greamers 
contained 10 policy recommendations, and was later underwritten by 
practically all relevant stakeholder associations and received support in 
parliament. Sometimes, as in a recent taxation debate between the association 
of social housing corporations and the government, the tradition of building 
consensus through “poldering  ” can quickly become a process of hard 
bargaining. A collaboration of activists opposing low-altitude flights 
(Samenwerkende Actiegropen Tegen Laagvliegen) justified their resistance to 
a new airport using reports that countered departmental policy research, and by 
citing expert opinions on EU rules (e.g., on issues of nitrogen thresholds and a 
level playing field in business competition). 
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Independent Supervisory Bodies 
Audit Office 
Score: 7 
 The Netherlands’ General Audit Chamber is the independent organ that audits 
the legality, effectiveness and efficiency of the national government’s 
spending. The court reports to the States General and government, and its 
members are recommended by the States General and appointed by the 
Council of Ministers. Parliament frequently consults with this institution and 
in many cases this leads to investigations. Investigations may also be initiated 
by ministers or deputy ministers. However, such requests are not formal due to 
the independent status of the General Audit Chamber. Requests by citizens are 
also taken into account. Every year, the chamber checks the financial 
evaluations of the ministries. Chamber reports are publicly accessible and can 
be found online and as parliamentary publications (Kamerstuk). Through 
unfortunate timing in view of (more) important political developments, in 
recent years such evaluations played only a minor role in parliamentary 
debates and government accountability problems. By selecting key issues in 
each departmental domain, the General Audit Chamber hopes to improve its 
efficacy as instrumental advice. In addition, there is an evident trend within the 
chamber to shift the focus of audits and policy evaluations from “oversight” to 
“insight.” In other words, the chamber is shifting from ex post accountability 
to ongoing policy-oriented learning. Unfortunately, this has been accompanied 
by a substantial reduction in resources for the Audit Chamber, resulting in a 
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Algemene Rekenkamer, Een toekomstbestendige Algemene Rekenkamer, 13 October 2016 (rekenkamer.nl, 
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 The National Ombudsman is a “high council of state” on a par with the two 
houses of the States General, the Council of State and the Netherlands General 
Audit Chamber. Like the judiciary, the high councils of state are formally 
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independent of the government. The National Ombudsman’s independence 
from the executive is increased by his/her appointment by the States General 
(specifically by the Second Chamber or Tweede Kamer). The appointment is 
for a term of six years, and reappointment is permitted. Recently, irked by the 
critical attitude of the former ombudsman, parliament made a series of 
stumbles, first by nominating a former interest-group leader to the post, who 
resigned after much public criticism; then 13 months passed before the present 
ombudsman, a renowned judge, formally took over. The National Ombudsman 
office was established to give individual citizens an opportunity to file 
complaints about the practices of government before an independent and 
expert body. Where the government is concerned, it is important to note that 
the National Ombudsman’s decisions are not legally enforceable. The 
ombudsman publishes his or her conclusions in annual reports. The 
ombudsman’s tasks are shifting toward providing concrete and active 
assistance to citizens who – due to debt and poverty, digitalization and other 
problems with access to government regulation – have lost their way in the 
bureaucratic process. On such issues, the ombudsman’s reports have in recent 
years become harsher in their judgments, as was the case for his forerunner. 
The national ombudsman is assisted by deputies tasked with addressing 
problems facing children and veterans. 
 
Citation:  
De Nationale Ombudsman, Mijn onbegrijpelijke overheid. Verslag van de Nationale ombudsman over 2012. 
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 The Dutch Data Protection Agency (Authoriteit Persoonsgegens, DPA) 
succeeded the “College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens” (CBP) in 2016, and 
simultaneously saw its formal competencies enhanced by the right to fine 
public and private organizations in violation of Dutch and since mid-2018 
European data protections laws (the General Data Protection Regulation, 
GDPR).  
 
Effective data protection is practically impossible since 2016 for a number of 
reasons: many capable personnel have left the DPA, even though the number 
of staff has increased; the new leadership is considered to be in disarray; the 
organization is under-financed; hardly any consequential fines have been 
imposed; “naming and shaming” appears to work, but oversight capacity is 
lacking; laws and regulations are frequently changing, and consequently 
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monitoring and jurisprudence are constantly “in the making.” It looks like the 
DPA is evolving from a supervisory body to an organization that advises both 
public and private organizations, and individual citizens on privacy issues, and 
on how to deal with personal data in ways that (more or less) comply with ever 
changing regulations and interpretations. All in all, the DPA operates in self-
contradictory ways (as both a “hard” inspectorate, and a “soft” advisory body 
that “names and shames,” and advises commercial and public data-users and 
data-providers) in a technologically turbulent environment. In 2019, the DPA 
found that most data leaks are caused through sloppiness in addressing 
documents and emails; that this occurs more in institutions of care than 
anywhere else; and that victims are usually individuals rather than entire 
categories of people. One exception led to a €460,000 fine for a hospital that 
had failed to protect its patient files sufficiently. Also in 2019, the DPA 
received an additional €3.4 million in funding for enforcement of the General 
Decree for Data Protection (Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming, 
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